Book Reviews

Alister McGrath, *Dawkins' God: Genes, Memes and the Meaning of Life* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), pp. vi + 202. Paperback £9.99, ISBN 1-4051-2538-1. Hardback £45.00, ISBN 1-4051-2539-X.

Zoologist Richard Dawkins, Professor of the Public Understanding of Science at Oxford University, is well known for his outspoken views on religion. One of the things he thinks the public ought to understand is how much better off we would be if only we would subscribe to his creed of scientific reductionism and polemical atheism. Alister McGrath, who is Professor of Historical Theology at Oxford, was first invited to write a book-length response to Dawkins as long ago as 1978, soon after the publication of Dawkins' The Selfish Gene, but he has waited until now to accept the challenge. McGrath, we learn, once held opinions similar to those of Dawkins. At school McGrath had become convinced that 'not only were the sciences intellectually fascinating and aesthetically delightful: they also undermined the plausibility of religious belief, and hence opened the way to a better world'. He thought his future would lie in 'bringing light and joy through preaching the gospel of scientific atheism'. However, just before going up to Oxford to read chemistry, he began to dabble in the history and philosophy of science and realized that things were 'more complicated' than he had reckoned on. After his conversion from atheism to Christianity he looked for a way of pursuing the study of theology alongside the practice of science. He gained a degree in theology whilst still working on his doctorate in biophysics, and was ordained in the Church of England. As his subsequent distinguished theological career developed he continued to keep an eye on Dawkins' movement from 'brilliant scientific popularizer' to 'savage anti-religious polemicist', and his conviction grew that Dawkins' atheism 'seemed to be tacked onto his evolutionary biology with intellectual velcro'. Twenty-five years after the idea had first been mooted, and disappointed that a comprehensive critique of Dawkins had not yet materialized from any other quarter, he decided to pen his response.

McGrath, not surprisingly, is at his best when he is on his own territory of historical theology. He accepts that in books such as *The Blind Watchmaker* (1986) and *Climbing Mount Improbable* (1996) Dawkins 'has certainly demonstrated that a purely natural description may be offered of what is currently known of the history and present state of living organisms'. But McGrath has no difficulty in showing that the divine 'watchmaker' who is thereby made redundant is not the God of the Christian tradition. The redundant god, he argues, had merely been a contingent and local (peculiarly English) conception; a response to the rise of the 'mechanical philosophy' which characterized the late seventeenth century and which had subsequently been transposed into the biological sphere in the late eighteenth century. McGrath is equally at home as he exposes the weaknesses of Dawkins' idea that cultural evolution is driven by a

Darwinian process involving the replication, transmission and selection of competing ideas, or 'memes'. He argues convincingly that, unlike genes, no entity has been discovered that corresponds to a meme. And unlike the role of genes in genetics, the history of ideas appears to manage perfectly well without the concept of the meme.

When McGrath moves from historical to philosophical perspectives his arguments carry less of a ring of authority, though no doubt this partly reflects the limitations inherent in writing a relatively short book in a non-technical style. For example, in the opening chapter, in which he outlines the basics of Darwinism, the level of criticism of Dawkins' gene's-eye view of evolution is fairly superficial. Although McGrath remarks that there are 'questionable assumptions' embedded in the selfish gene idea, the only objection he specifically discusses is the problem of imputing motives to molecular entities. He does not mention the doubts that have been raised by philosophers about assuming that genes are the only level of selection, that Darwinian evolution requires a distinction between replicators and interactors, or that the genome is a blue-print or set of instructions for building an organism. On these issues the philosophy of biology has generally been highly critical of Dawkins' extreme genetic reductionism, and it therefore seems curious that McGrath does not call these witnesses.

If the opening chapter is thin on the philosophy of biology, I also found McGrath's central chapter on 'Proof and Faith' rather disappointing on wider epistemological questions. McGrath demolishes Dawkins' claim that faith (to quote Dawkins) 'means blind trust, in the absence of evidence, even in the teeth of evidence'. He then argues (I think rightly) that Dawkins' atheism rests not on his science but 'on an unstated and largely unexamined cluster of hidden non-scientific values and beliefs'. According to McGrath, Dawkins presents atheism as if it is a conclusion carrying the certainty of a deductive argument. The problem, McGrath argues, is Dawkins' failure to acknowledge the uncertainty inherent in the fact that the premises of his argument (i.e., the scientific theories) arise from inductive (and therefore potentially erroneous) reasoning. This seems to me to be an odd way of expressing the flaws in Dawkins' position, and leads McGrath to the surprising speculation that perhaps in future the Darwinian theory of evolution may 'one day have to be radically modified, or even abandoned'. What seems to be missing from McGrath's account is the role, alongside deductive and inductive reasoning, of *hypothesis*. Scientific theories are not chains of deductive or inductive reasoning (though they may involve these); rather, they are networks of hypotheses, some of which are more provisional than others. The core hypotheses of Darwinism are secure enough that they are highly unlikely to require significant modification. The main flaw in Dawkins' argument, surely, is that the 'core' hypothesis of theistic belief, namely the hypothesis of the reality (some may prefer 'existence') of God, cannot be disproved by any empirical scientific observation. (This is not to suggest that religious belief is closed to rational criticism: the network of narratives and hypotheses that constitute a religious cosmology faces the test of coherence in the light of scientific, and other, insights.) McGrath is right that Dawkins' deductive argument for atheism is unsound. However, the reason for this has more to do with the nature of (the concept of) God than with the provisionality of scientific theories.

McGrath intends his critique to engage the reader in a 'popular debate ... above the tedious drone of normal scholarly discussion', and this is probably the spirit in which the book will be best appreciated. His declared aim is the mainly negative task of exposing the weaknesses in Dawkins' claim that the truth of evolutionary theory logically entails atheism, and in this he is largely successful. He is at his most

engaging when reflecting on the development of his own position from an autobiographical perspective. By analogy, I think his critique of scientific atheism would have been all the more compelling had he chosen to say more about the Christian doctrine of creation and the historical development of the doctrine as a way of making sense of the world and our place in it. For an introduction to that more positive side of the story one could turn to *The Science of God* (2004), another of the offerings in McGrath's remarkably prolific recent output.

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Graham Harvey, *Animism: Respecting the Living World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. xivv + 248. Paperback \$27.50, ISBN 0-231-13701-X. Hardback \$67.50, ISBN 0-231-13700-1.

Although the title of this book is *Animism*, it is the subtitle which reveals that much more than just traditional forms of animism are explored. Graham Harvey is much more concerned with the ways in which animism, both indigenous and contemporary, and related forms of spirituality are evolving in the face of modernity. His research into contemporary Paganism and other modern religious phenomena during the 1990s, as well as his involvement with grass roots environmental groups in the UK over the last 15 years or so, has given him a perspective that perhaps few other religious studies scholars have been able to experience first-hand. His frequent participation in Pagan rituals and happenings, as well as his involvement with a variety of direct action groups and protesters, has given him important insights into the way in which modern and traditional spiritualities are evolving in an increasingly interconnected world. His exploration of contemporary nature religions in *Listening People*, Speaking Earth, his 1997 book which focused solely on contemporary Pagan groups (and hedgehogs), has now been expanded upon to include a much broader range of contemporary and traditional practitioners who see the world as alive, connected, and in some way intertwined with human life as much as with plant and animal life.

Animism has traditionally been defined as a '"belief in spirits" or "non-empirical beings", and/or a confusion about life and death among some indigenous people, young children or all religious people' (p. xi). Harvey finds this form of definition limiting and out of date, and sets out to re-define contemporary forms of animism based on four case studies that are presented in Part II of the book. In this refreshing and timely review, Harvey explores the concept of animism from a variety of cultural and academic perspectives. His own definition of animists as 'people who recognize that the world is full of persons, only some of whom are human' opens up the discussion to a new and broader understanding of this pan-cultural phenomena (p. xi).

Harvey begins in Part I of this four part discussion with an exhaustive review of the many authors who, over the years, have attempted to describe and define animism, often with the intention of dismissing such beliefs and practices as childish or primitive, or at the very least, less sophisticated than those practised by members of organized religions. He reviews the ideas of Frazer, Tylor, Freud, Durkheim, and many others who have written on the subject, noting that, from subjects as diverse as philosophy, anthropology, and biology, 'the notion that matter is in some sense conscious has a long and noble history' (p. 17). He concludes this section by suggesting that, rather than abandoning the term altogether, 'there are better reasons to celebrate its reclamation and re-application' (p. 28). He therefore sets out to 'demonstrate that animism is useful as a label for some actions, relationships, understandings, rhetorics, narratives, performances, constructions, worldviews and lifeways' (p. 28).

In Part II, Harvey takes a closer look at four specific cultures where animism is practiced in one form or another: the Ojibwe of North America, the Maori of New Zealand, the Australian Aborigines, and contemporary Pagans in Western Europe. Each case study provides insights as to how these people all hold variations on the notion that the world is alive with spirits or people, including 'stone people', 'fish people', and many other forms of non-human people. In each case study, Harvey points out ways in which these groups attempt to show respect for all life through their religious or spiritual beliefs and practices.

The last two parts of the book are devoted to some of the issues and challenges facing modern animists in general, including discussions relating to shamanism, cannibalism, environmentalism, and ethics. Harvey takes a closer look at what it means to be an animist, whether through tradition or choice, in the twenty-first century. In the final part of the book he even delves into topics as diverse as eco-feminism, 'cyberconsciousness', post-dualism and quantum physics.

Animism, it could be argued, is a book that reflects the continuing modern-day evolution occurring between spirituality and the human need to connect with the natural world. When Harvey focused on contemporary Paganism eight years ago, he—like many scholars of religion—was noting the growing need for humans to rebalance and reconnect with the feminine and with nature through the expression of spiritual principles and practices. Some have referred to this phenomenon as biofilia, or the almost biological need humans have for interacting with the natural world. Now, as Harvey explores modern expressions of animism (of which contemporary Paganism is a part), he takes this idea a step further and moves outside of Western/European cultures into a variety of modern (and traditionally based) cultures where animism has become not just a religious practice, but a way of 'living well' and a 'local way to show respect' (p. 208). As he concludes, animism 'provides various ways of speaking, listening, acting and being that achieve this with grace and beauty' (p. 212).

This is a beautifully presented book that is equally applicable to the fields of anthropology, philosophy, sociology and religious studies. Harvey writes with a light-hearted style that is, at the same time, deeply curious about a growing phenomenon of religious behaviour. He has captured an important snapshot of human spiritual evolution that is likely to receive greater attention from scholars of religion in years to come, and has demonstrated that he is keeping his academic finger on the pulse of the ways in which modern humans are coping with a rapidly changing world.

Amy C. Simes Frostburg State University 19 Braddock Road Fuller House Frostburg MD 21532 Alan Wallace (ed.), *Buddhism and Science: Breaking New Ground* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. xviii + 444. Paperback \$33.00, ISBN 0-231-12335-3. Hardback \$73.50, ISBN 0-231-123334-5.

Buddhism and Science follows a trend of looking at religion and science in dialogue. It is an enterprise worth undertaking and offers an important opportunity for learning the values of both. Most of the contributors either implicitly or explicitly take the position that Buddhism is particularly well-positioned to engage in this dialogue because Buddhism is based on the search for truth through, B. Alan Wallace argues, experiential insight gained through Buddhist practice. But, is Buddhism only this?

Wallace's introduction serves less as an introduction than as an opportunity to voice his positions that science reflects a metaphysical position, and that while science has largely ignored the exploration of the mind, Buddhism has achieved a great deal by using the technology of meditation. While he acknowledges that other religions also have truth claims, he insists that this issue can be settled by adopting 'a uniform ontological stance, combined with a wide range of modes of investigation and analysis' (p. 26). In other words, he makes the challenge to all religions to prove their truth claims by science, and remains confident that Buddhism will be able to do so. It should probably be pointed out here that such a statement may open the way to dialogue with science, but it closes the door to interfaith dialogue.

The text itself is divided into three sections. The first section deals with historical context. José Ignacio Cabezón's opening essay in this first section goes much further in providing an introduction than does Wallace's 'Introduction' and proves to be one of the best essays in the collection. He provides the reader with an historical survey of the dialogue between Buddhism and science and usefully breaks up interactions into the three categories of conflict/ambivalence, compatibility/identity and complementarity. The second part deals with Buddhism and cognitive sciences and impressively starts with an essay by His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The highlight of this section, in my opinion, is William S. Waldron's essay that contends that the erroneous belief in an independent self that Buddhism takes as a tragic error is probably an evolutionary adaptation that provided advantages for survival. The third section deals with Buddhism and the physical sciences. Specifically, the chapters here deal with quantum physics and how their suppositions overlap with elements of the Buddhist understanding of the world.

I have two principal criticisms of this work, both pointing to the overwhelming tendency of the contributors to focus only on specific aspects of Buddhism which fit into their dialogue. This may be understandable, since the stated aim is to find common ground. Nonetheless, there is a lack of reflexivity in this endeavour, and a strong inclination to use the general (as in 'Buddhism') when what is really meant is the specific ('Buddhist Meditation' or 'Tibetan Buddhism'). This representation of Buddhism is disconcertingly exclusionary. Notable exceptions are Cabezón's overview and typology of the interaction between Buddhism and science and Piet Hut's concluding chapter. Both recognize some of the implications of the dialogue and both are more reflexive about what they are including and excluding in their discussions.

The generalized use of the label 'Buddhism' in this collection does not mean that the book is representing a variety of Buddhist perspectives. In fact, almost all of the contributors are Western adherents of Tibetan Buddhism. Without the participation of the H.H. the Dalai Lama, and his principal interpreter, Thupten Jinpa, one could also

argue that what is being represented here is an elite, Western and male view which ignores the diversity found within Buddhism. As I intimated at the beginning of this review, the contributors to *Buddhism and Science* are mostly selective about what they choose to call Buddhism before setting forward with their dialogue. The 'default' Buddhism of this text is limited almost solely to meditative techniques and represents almost exclusively the Tibetan tradition and the Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy. Missing is the essential ethical component of Buddhism. Missing also is a voice from other schools—notably the Pure Land tradition, which appears to be excluded from 'Buddhism' due to the fact that meditation is not as central. Wallace, as well as several other contributors, note that H.H. the Dalai Lama has stated that Buddhism should be prepared to abandon any assertions that science is able to refute with compelling evidence (p. 26). However, the fact that H.H. the Dalai Lama is himself believed to be a reincarnation of past Dalai Lamas and ultimately an incarnation of the bodhisattva Avalokitesvara is not mentioned.

Miriam Levering in *Buddhism, Sexuality, and Gender* (edited by Cabezón who is also a contributor to *Buddhism and Science*), has persuasively argued that the rhetoric of Ch'an Buddhism in China emphasized qualities that implicitly disqualify most women from participation. This volume strikes me as being guilty of the same thing. Devotional practices, which engage most Buddhist women (and perhaps most Buddhists) in the world, are excluded because they do not practice meditation and are therefore not truly Buddhism (i.e. the Buddhism that Wallace claims can be objectively verified). Not insignificantly, all the contributors of this volume are men, with the exception of Natalie Depraz, who co-authored with a man.

The quality of the essays in *Buddhism and Science* is without doubt high, and it will certainly make a contribution to the dialogue between science and religion. However, the majority of essays are likely inaccessible for those with a general interest in religion and science but who lack specialist knowledge of Buddhist philosophy, Western philosophy (notably Kant and Husserl), cognitive neuropsychology and quantum physics. An example of the inaccessibility of the language can be found in Michael Bitbol's essay, who writes (without explaining the symbols): 'In a tetralemma he denies (by challenging their logical coherence [*na yujyate, nopapadye*] or their factual relevance [*na vidyate*]) the four following forms of thesis: P, ¬P, P& ¬P, ¬P& ¬ ¬P' (p. 31). The target audiences, it would appear, are Western scientists who are also Buddhist or Buddhists/Buddhologists who have an interest in science. In this case, the point of dialogue is lost as they seem to be talking among themselves.

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Bronislaw Szerszynski, *Nature, Technology, and the Sacred* (Religion and Spirituality in the Modern World Series; Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. xviii + 221. Paperback £20.99, ISBN 0-631-23604X. Hardback £55.00, ISBN 0-631-236031.

The kernel idea of this book is that our present ideas and practices regarding nature and technology do not represent the disappearance of the sacred from our social imagination, so that a plainly and simply 'disenchanted' nature provides the ground for an aggressive pursuit of technology, that technology has driven the sacred out of nature. Rather, our approaches to the natural world and technology reveal the persistence of the sacred, albeit in transformed ways. This is an important work that shifts the direction analysis of what we are doing and what we ought to be doing for the whole of ecological philosophy and ethics. The clear demonstration that religious impulses are active, where they might be unsuspected, would on its own be a helpful contribution. But this book is much more than that.

Szersynski's argument is so intricate that any brief recounting will be inadequate. But to summarize in broad strokes, he founds his case by recasting the 'disenchantment' narrative as a reordering of the sacred that has taken place through several contingent junction points in the history of Western culture. These have shaped the way in which both nature and technology are presently related to the sacred, which is explored through various dimensions, such as the body, the emergence of the concept of 'the environment' and the science of ecology, literature, and politics. The book ends with a forward gaze toward a future 'global sacred' and projects possible trends.

This recasting of the narrative to demonstrate the internal connections of the natural, the sacred and technology runs like this: Tracing what he calls 'the "long arc" of institutional monotheism', Szersynski names distinct historical periods. During the first two, characterized by the 'primal' sacred and 'archaic' sacred, the practice of techne, or craft, was integrated into human/non-human relations conceived on a contract or gift-exchange basis, and the sacred was located within an earthly realm. With the rise of monotheism, a vertical axis appears in which the divine is conceived as distinct from the natural world as a transcendent reality 'above' it. This distinction becomes absolute with the Reformation, and yet the idea of vocation, or devotional activity, is redirected from specialized religious life and practice to the activity of everyday life. It is as an extension rather than a rupture of this trajectory that in the 'modern sacred', 'nature', or biological existence, comes to be seen as the locus of the generation of being and order, rather than derived from a transcendent order and Being. Thus what had been at the other pole of the vertical axis becomes interjected into the material world as an ordering principle, whether it be conceived as the Reason of the Enlightenment or the authenticity of Romanticism. It is in this context that technology (in the service of understanding, then mastery, of the powerful natural) takes on a sense of agency and the quality of the sublime. The sacred has not vanished but has been reordered, yet without a single location. And so, in the 'postmodern sacred' both monism and dualism are forsaken for multiplicity, where meaning and order are seen as located and generated in subjectivity. This plurality can accommodate previous conceptions of the sacred, but cannot impose any one of them.

What this recasting does, I think, is portray a more accurate assessment of the dynamics at work both historically and in the present than the assumption that the natural, the sacred, and technology are antithetical. Likewise, the segments of the book that deal with the transformation from *techne* at the service of a social-sacred cosmos to the present technological ordering of our society and our thrall to the technological 'sublime' are much more sophisticated and helpful than much of the previous discourse in philosophy and theology. Having this work provides a surer basis on which to conceive of ways in which we can move into a more sustainable future.

I have, however, a caution and reservation about this book. The caution is that this is a specialized work, accessible primarily to those who are already familiar with the

existing state of the discussion in its historical, philosophical and religious dimensions. It assumes much prior knowledge. It would be a valuable addition to a scholarly collection, but it is not a place to begin for anyone being introduced to the state of the questions. The reservation arose for me in relation to the use of the words 'primal' and 'archaic' for pre-monotheist history and the use of indigenous cultures to speculatively reconstruct these. Although Szerszynski briefly notes that 'small-scale societies that still endure despite the globalization of Western culture should not be seen as anachronistic survivals of some earlier stage of world history', using them for this purpose under the terms 'primal' and 'archaic' implicitly perpetuates that notion (p. 26). Further, to use two contemporary examples to assert that the 'pre-modern' concept of human/non-human interaction in terms of social relationships to discount the notion (characterized as 'anachronistic') that nature was regarded ethically both stretches the argument too thin for credibility and reveals an ethnocentrism in the concept of ethics being employed. This is not the only place where I felt too much was being claimed on too little evidence, but in other areas it seemed less consequential and more the result of attempting a very ambitious project, one that remains, nevertheless, well worth engaging.

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Julian H. Franklin, *Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. xix + 151. Hardback \$30, ISBN 0-231-13422-3.

Julian Franklin states his purpose quite clearly at the beginning of *Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy*: 'to rework the theory of animal rights and suggest some new directions' (p. xi). He does this by rethinking the positions of a number of philosophers who have dealt directly with animal rights such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan. But Franklin takes a more complicated route when he addresses Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative, offering a revised form of Kant's foundational philosophical theory. Based on this revision, Franklin takes on the responses of other philosophers to Kant and offers critiques of these responses. He concludes the volume with a shift to feminism, environmentalism, and animal rights. Staying within the realm of moral philosophy, Franklin focuses on the legitimate interests of animals clashing, in some situations, with the legitimate interests of humans.

The critique of Singer's utilitarianism is fairly standard, providing little new insight into a widely disputed approach. Regan's argument for animal rights, with its emphasis on subjectivity and inherent value, fares better in Franklin's opinion. He takes into account and discredits the critiques by Carruthers and Pluhar, suggesting then that his basic objection to Regan is the lack of grounding. But, this grounding, according to Franklin, is in a less than obvious place—Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative.

Franklin's reinterpretation of Kant is the pivotal point in his philosophy of animal rights. By examining the formulas of universal law and of humanity (as an end in itself), he revises Kant's categorical imperative: 'Act in such a way that you always

treat sentience, whether in your self or the self of any other sentient being, never simply as a means but at the same time as an end' (p. 35-36). In short, he suggests that Kant cannot restrict the formula of universal law by the formula of humanity. This expansion of rights to beings with sentience takes into account 'things' (including plants) which Franklin does place in a different category (unlike Regan).

Examining Post-Kantian positions, Franklin turns to John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Rawls's idea of the 'veil of ignorance', used to determine which principles of justice are chosen, is metaphorically 'lifted' by universalization. Thus, Rawls's contractualism is revealed to have a fatal flaw and animals can no longer be treated as instruments or means only. Universalizability is also key with Habermas, whose focus on actual discourse excludes those without speech. Finally, through the lens of Locke's social contract, Franklin determines that animals, as 'moral patients', can and must be included via 'enforcement of human duties' (p. 74).

The final two chapters shift direction significantly. Compassion, as articulated by Schweitzer, and an ethic of care, central to many ecofeminist theorists, offer a different approach to human-other animal moral philosophy. Neither approach is sufficient, according to Franklin, because of the inevitable slide into welfareism. In addition, and as a seeming aside, he ventures briefly into the world's religious traditions and finds their potential flawed based on a variety of problems, including sin, sacrifice, and the eating of meat in most of them. While it would have lengthened the work substantially, exploration into the area of religion could have strengthened his arguments.

Franklin's final trek involves the widely known 'lifeboat incident' (four humans, one dog in a lifeboat, one must go overboard for the other four to survive). He examines this from the perspectives of Regan, Francione, Pluhar, and others. Then this particularity is expanded into the entire realm of environmentalism and the potential clash of humans-other animals. Franklin's conclusions here are telling: 'this primacy for humans, I believe, is as it should be'. In a nutshell, he determines that humans are morally obliged 'never to treat any sentient beings as mere instruments', yet simultaneously, if there are conflicts 'of legitimate interest between animals and humans', human interests win. Certainly conservation of the environment is a concern and 'unjustified intrusion' into the environments of animals is wrong, but humans can 'override this principle' when doing so 'would enhance their quality of life' (p. 113).

Franklin offers a significant revision of Kant's categorical imperative and displays how it can, indeed, be a guiding philosophical position for those addressing other-than-human animals. His argument, in this sense, is strong, well-grounded, and clearly articulated. But, in the end, Franklin's position seems to contradict itself with the trek into the lifeboat. It seems that, on an individual level, his moral philosophy stands on solid ground: sentient beings should never be mere instruments and have rights as moral patients. But on the more difficult species level, he remains, clearly, within the category of those others whom he has labeled as specieist. Indeed, he is as well.

In addition, an interesting, and potentially controversial, example underlies Franklin's entire proposal: the vegetarian question. He self-identifies in the 'Acknowledgments' as a 'vegetarian (with vegan aspirations) for the last twenty years' (p. xvii). Throughout it is this particular issue (the vegetarian question) that provides the context, or the practical application, for his moral philosophy. But, again, this is individual, not universalist. An easy trajectory, based on the final chapter, could take

the conflict of humans and other species and, based on Franklin's position, easily determine that other animals can be eaten.

Even with those minor critiques in place, this book is well worth a careful read. Franklin deals with most of the major theorists succinctly and thoughtfully, providing different avenues of exploration into the possibilities of animal rights. His ideas are certainly worth consideration in this expanding field of inquiry.

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