What Does CSR Believe about Religion and CSR?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1558/jcsr.20691Keywords:
motivated cognition, cognitive bias, ideological surround, group identityAbstract
In chapter 5 of her text, Claire White discusses what the CSR has discovered regarding how people develop beliefs about the nature of the world and how it works. Cognitive science recognizes several mechanisms that influence beliefs, both religious and nonreligious. We review some of the literature on the cognitive origin of beliefs and apply the principles identified by cognitive science to CSR beliefs about religion. What do CSR researchers believe about religion and religious experiences, and what do they believe about the CSR itself ? Variables found by the CSR to influence religious beliefs are the same factors that influence all beliefs, including beliefs CSR researchers hold about the research process in which they are engaged. We propose Watson’s Ideological Surround Model (ISM) as a way of handling perceived incompatibilities between beliefs about religion and religious experience held by scientific researchers and those held by religious individuals.
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