Philosophy, Belief and Cognitive Science of Religion
A (Sympathetic) Response to Gardiner and Engler
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1558/jcsr.v3i1.29555Keywords:
cognitive science of religion, cognitionReferences
Atran, Scott. 2002. In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Barrett, Justin. 2004. Why Would Anyone Believe in God? Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
Griffiths, Paul, John Wilkins 2013. “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in Three Domains: Fact, Value, and Religion.” In A New Science of Religion, edited by Gregory Dawes and James Maclaurin, 133–146. New York: Routledge.
Jong, Jonathan, Visala, Aku. 2014. “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments against Theism, Reconsidered.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76(3): 243–258. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9461-6
Joyce, Richard. 2006. The Evolution of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kahane, Guy 2011, “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.” Noûs 45:103–125. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00770.x
Leech, David, Visala, Aku. 2012. “How Relevant Is the Cognitive Science of Religion to Philosophy of Religion?” In Scientific Approaches to Philosophy of Religion, edited by Yujin Nagasawa, 165–183. London: Palgrave MacMillan. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137026019.0016
Mameli, Matteo, Bateson, Patrick. 2011. “An Evaluation of the Concept of Innateness.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 366: 436–443. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2010.0174
McCauley, Robert. 2011. Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McCauley, Robert 2007. “Reduction: Models of Cross-Scientific Relations and Their Implications for the Psychology-Neuroscience Interface.” In Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science, edited by Paul Thagard, 105–158. Amsterdam: Elsevier. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-044451540-7/50021-9
Pyysiäinen, Ilkka. 2009. Supernatural Agents: Why We Believe in Souls, Gods and Buddhas. Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195380026.001.0001
Samuels, Richard. 2007. “Is Innateness a Confused Notion?” In Foundations and the Future, Vol. 3 of ?The Innate Mind, edited by Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen Stich, 107–121. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schloss, Jeff, Murray, Michael, ed. 2009. The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical and Theological Reflections on the Origins of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557028.001.0001
Slone, D. Jason. 2004. Theological Incorrectness: Why Religious People Believe What They Shouldn’t. Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195169263.001.0001
Visala, Aku. 2011. Naturalism, Theism, and the Cognitive Study of Religion: Religion Explained? Farnham: Ashgate.
Barrett, Justin. 2004. Why Would Anyone Believe in God? Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
Griffiths, Paul, John Wilkins 2013. “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in Three Domains: Fact, Value, and Religion.” In A New Science of Religion, edited by Gregory Dawes and James Maclaurin, 133–146. New York: Routledge.
Jong, Jonathan, Visala, Aku. 2014. “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments against Theism, Reconsidered.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76(3): 243–258. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9461-6
Joyce, Richard. 2006. The Evolution of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kahane, Guy 2011, “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.” Noûs 45:103–125. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00770.x
Leech, David, Visala, Aku. 2012. “How Relevant Is the Cognitive Science of Religion to Philosophy of Religion?” In Scientific Approaches to Philosophy of Religion, edited by Yujin Nagasawa, 165–183. London: Palgrave MacMillan. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137026019.0016
Mameli, Matteo, Bateson, Patrick. 2011. “An Evaluation of the Concept of Innateness.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 366: 436–443. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2010.0174
McCauley, Robert. 2011. Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McCauley, Robert 2007. “Reduction: Models of Cross-Scientific Relations and Their Implications for the Psychology-Neuroscience Interface.” In Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science, edited by Paul Thagard, 105–158. Amsterdam: Elsevier. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-044451540-7/50021-9
Pyysiäinen, Ilkka. 2009. Supernatural Agents: Why We Believe in Souls, Gods and Buddhas. Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195380026.001.0001
Samuels, Richard. 2007. “Is Innateness a Confused Notion?” In Foundations and the Future, Vol. 3 of ?The Innate Mind, edited by Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen Stich, 107–121. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schloss, Jeff, Murray, Michael, ed. 2009. The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical and Theological Reflections on the Origins of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557028.001.0001
Slone, D. Jason. 2004. Theological Incorrectness: Why Religious People Believe What They Shouldn’t. Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195169263.001.0001
Visala, Aku. 2011. Naturalism, Theism, and the Cognitive Study of Religion: Religion Explained? Farnham: Ashgate.
Published
2016-05-03
Issue
Section
Commentary/Responses
License
Equinox Publishing Ltd.
How to Cite
Visala, A. (2016). Philosophy, Belief and Cognitive Science of Religion: A (Sympathetic) Response to Gardiner and Engler. Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion, 3(1), 69-74. https://doi.org/10.1558/jcsr.v3i1.29555
