Mind-Independent Values Don’t Exist, But Moral Truth Does
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1558/eph.33214Keywords:
John Dewey, Moral abolitionism, Moral fictionalism, Moral error theory, Moral truth, Moral objectivityAbstract
The falsity of moral claims is commonly deduced from two tenets: that they presuppose the existence of objective values and that these values don’t exist. Hence, the error theory concludes, moral claims are false. In this paper, I put pressure on the image of human morality that is presupposed in moving from the non-existence of objective values to the falsity of moral claims. I argue that, while, understood in a certain way, the two premises of the error theory are correct, this does not render moral discourse false, because moral objectivity is disanalogous to objectivity in empirical sciences and as such need not be characterized in terms of mind-independency. Using Dewey, I illuminate the possibility of accommodating the guiding intuitions of the error theory in a first-order account of morality.
References
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Asay, Jamin. 2012. “A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93: 373-394. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01431.x
———. 2013. “Truthmaking, Metaethics and Creeping Minimalism.” Philosophical Studies 163: 213–232.
Barber, Alex. “Science’s Immunity to Moral Refutation.” Australian Journal of Philosophy 91: 633?653. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2013.768279
Blackburn, Simon. 1998. Ruling Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 1999. “Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-Realist Foundation?” Inquiry 42: 213?227. https://doi.org/10.1080/002017499321552
Burgess, John. P. 2010. “Against Ethics.” In A World Without Values, edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, 1?15. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
Campbell, Richmond. 2015. “Moral Epistemology.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2015 Edition, edited by Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/moral-epistemology/
Campbell, Richmond and Kumar, Victor. 2013. “Pragmatic Naturalism and Moral Objectivity.” Analysis 73: 446?455. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ant058
Dewey, John. 1975 [1891]. “Moral Theory and Practice.” In The Early Works, Volume 3, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 93?109. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
———. 2004 [1916]. Essays in Experimental Logic. New York: Dover.
———. 1983 [1922]. “Valuation and Experimental Knowlegde.” In The Middle Works Volume 13, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 3?28. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
———. 1923. Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Henry Holt & Company.
———. 1925/1984. “Value, Objective Reference, and Criticism.” In The Later Works , Volume 2, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 78?97. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
———. 1929. The Quest for Certainty. New York: Minton, Balch & Company.
———. 1938/1982. Logic, the Theory of Inquiry. New York: Irvington.
———. 1939/1988. “Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder.” In The Later Works, Volume 14, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 3?90. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
———. 1988 [1939]. “Theory of Valuation.” In The Later Works, Volume 13, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 189?252. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Dewey, John. 1989 [1943]. “Valuation Judgments and Immediate Quality.” In The Later Works, Volume 15, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 63?72. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Diggins, John. 1994. The Promise of Pragmatism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Faraci, David. 2015. “A Hard Look at Moral Perception”. Philosophical Studies 172: 2055?2072. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0397-6
Garner, Richard. 2010. “Abolishing Morality.” In A World Without Values, edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, 217?233. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_13
Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. “The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.” Psychological Review 108: 813?834. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814
———. 2010. “Moral Psychology Must Not Be Based on Faith and Hope: Commentary on Narvaez (2010).” Perspectives on Psychological Science 5: 182?184. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610362352
———. 2013. The Righteous Mind. New York: Vintage.
Haidt, Jonathan, and Joseph, Craig. 2008. “The Moral Mind.” In The Innate Mind, Volume 3, edited by Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence and Stephen Stick, 367–392. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332834.003.0019
Haidt, Jonathan, and Bjorklund, Fredrik. 2007. “Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions About Morality.” In Moral Psychology, Volume 2, The Cognitive Science of Morality, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, 181?217. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Husi, Stan. 2014. “Against Moral Fictionalism.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 11: 80?96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681008
Joyce, Richard. 2001. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487101
———. 2005. “Moral Fictionalism.” In Fictionalism in Metaphysics, edited by Mark Kalderon, 287?313. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2006. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
———. 2008. “Morality, Schmorality.” In Morality and Self-Interest, edited by Paul Bloomfield, 51?75. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Joyce, Richard and Simon Kirchin. 2010. “Introduction.” In A World Without Values, edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, ix-xxiv. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0
Kahane, Guy. 2011. “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.” NOÛS 45: 103?125. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00770.x
Kirchin, Simon. 2010. “A Tension in the Moral Error Theory.” In A World Without Values, edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, 167?182. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_10
Kitcher, Philip. 2011. The Ethical Project. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674063075
LaFolette, Hugh. 2000.“Pragmatic Ethics.” In Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, edited by Hugh LaFolette, 400?419. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lillehammer, Hallvard. 2004. “Moral Error Theory.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104: 95–111. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00083.x
Lutz, Matthew. 2014. “The ‘What Now’ Problem for Error Theory.” Philosophical Studies 171: 351?371. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0275-7
Mackie, John L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
McCarthy, Christine. 1999. “Dewey’s Ethics: Philosophy or Science?” Educational Theory 49: 339?358. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.1999.00339.x
Morton, Adam. 2003. The Importance of Being Understood. New York: Routledge.
McGrath, Sarah. 2011. “Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism.” Journal of Philosophy 108: 111?137. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil201110837
Nagel, Thomas. 1986. The View From Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press.
Navarez, Darcia. 2010. “Moral Complexity: The Fatal Attraction of Truthiness and the Importance of Mature Moral Functioning.” Perspectives on Psychological Science 5: 163?181. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610362351
Nichols, Shuan. 2004. Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195169344.001.0001
Nolan, Daniel, Greg Restall, and Caroline West. 2005. “Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83: 307–330. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400500191917
Olson, Jonas. 2014. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.001.0001
Prinz, Jesse. 2006. “The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments.” Philosophical Explorations 9: 29?43. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869790500492466
Rawls, John B. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Richardson, Henry S. 1998. “Truth and Ends in Dewey’s Pragmatism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28: 109?147. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1998.10717497
Sauer, Hanno. Forthcoming. “No Excuses for Moral Realism.” Unpublished Manuscript.
Svoboda, Toby. 2015. “Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 1: 1?25. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-46810047
Warnock, Geoffrey J. 1971. The Object of Morality. London: Methuen.
West, Caroline. 2010. “Business As Usual? The Error Theory, Internalism, and the Function of Morality.” In A World Without Values edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, 183?198. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_11
Williams, Bernard A. O. 1981. Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139165860
———. 2004. Truth and Truthfulness. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Asay, Jamin. 2012. “A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93: 373-394. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01431.x
———. 2013. “Truthmaking, Metaethics and Creeping Minimalism.” Philosophical Studies 163: 213–232.
Barber, Alex. “Science’s Immunity to Moral Refutation.” Australian Journal of Philosophy 91: 633?653. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2013.768279
Blackburn, Simon. 1998. Ruling Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 1999. “Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-Realist Foundation?” Inquiry 42: 213?227. https://doi.org/10.1080/002017499321552
Burgess, John. P. 2010. “Against Ethics.” In A World Without Values, edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, 1?15. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
Campbell, Richmond. 2015. “Moral Epistemology.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2015 Edition, edited by Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/moral-epistemology/
Campbell, Richmond and Kumar, Victor. 2013. “Pragmatic Naturalism and Moral Objectivity.” Analysis 73: 446?455. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ant058
Dewey, John. 1975 [1891]. “Moral Theory and Practice.” In The Early Works, Volume 3, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 93?109. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
———. 2004 [1916]. Essays in Experimental Logic. New York: Dover.
———. 1983 [1922]. “Valuation and Experimental Knowlegde.” In The Middle Works Volume 13, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 3?28. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
———. 1923. Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Henry Holt & Company.
———. 1925/1984. “Value, Objective Reference, and Criticism.” In The Later Works , Volume 2, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 78?97. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
———. 1929. The Quest for Certainty. New York: Minton, Balch & Company.
———. 1938/1982. Logic, the Theory of Inquiry. New York: Irvington.
———. 1939/1988. “Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder.” In The Later Works, Volume 14, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 3?90. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
———. 1988 [1939]. “Theory of Valuation.” In The Later Works, Volume 13, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 189?252. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Dewey, John. 1989 [1943]. “Valuation Judgments and Immediate Quality.” In The Later Works, Volume 15, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, 63?72. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Diggins, John. 1994. The Promise of Pragmatism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Faraci, David. 2015. “A Hard Look at Moral Perception”. Philosophical Studies 172: 2055?2072. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0397-6
Garner, Richard. 2010. “Abolishing Morality.” In A World Without Values, edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, 217?233. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_13
Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. “The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.” Psychological Review 108: 813?834. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814
———. 2010. “Moral Psychology Must Not Be Based on Faith and Hope: Commentary on Narvaez (2010).” Perspectives on Psychological Science 5: 182?184. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610362352
———. 2013. The Righteous Mind. New York: Vintage.
Haidt, Jonathan, and Joseph, Craig. 2008. “The Moral Mind.” In The Innate Mind, Volume 3, edited by Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence and Stephen Stick, 367–392. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332834.003.0019
Haidt, Jonathan, and Bjorklund, Fredrik. 2007. “Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions About Morality.” In Moral Psychology, Volume 2, The Cognitive Science of Morality, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, 181?217. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Husi, Stan. 2014. “Against Moral Fictionalism.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 11: 80?96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681008
Joyce, Richard. 2001. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487101
———. 2005. “Moral Fictionalism.” In Fictionalism in Metaphysics, edited by Mark Kalderon, 287?313. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2006. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
———. 2008. “Morality, Schmorality.” In Morality and Self-Interest, edited by Paul Bloomfield, 51?75. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Joyce, Richard and Simon Kirchin. 2010. “Introduction.” In A World Without Values, edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, ix-xxiv. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0
Kahane, Guy. 2011. “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.” NOÛS 45: 103?125. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00770.x
Kirchin, Simon. 2010. “A Tension in the Moral Error Theory.” In A World Without Values, edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, 167?182. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_10
Kitcher, Philip. 2011. The Ethical Project. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674063075
LaFolette, Hugh. 2000.“Pragmatic Ethics.” In Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, edited by Hugh LaFolette, 400?419. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lillehammer, Hallvard. 2004. “Moral Error Theory.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104: 95–111. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00083.x
Lutz, Matthew. 2014. “The ‘What Now’ Problem for Error Theory.” Philosophical Studies 171: 351?371. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0275-7
Mackie, John L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
McCarthy, Christine. 1999. “Dewey’s Ethics: Philosophy or Science?” Educational Theory 49: 339?358. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.1999.00339.x
Morton, Adam. 2003. The Importance of Being Understood. New York: Routledge.
McGrath, Sarah. 2011. “Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism.” Journal of Philosophy 108: 111?137. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil201110837
Nagel, Thomas. 1986. The View From Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press.
Navarez, Darcia. 2010. “Moral Complexity: The Fatal Attraction of Truthiness and the Importance of Mature Moral Functioning.” Perspectives on Psychological Science 5: 163?181. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610362351
Nichols, Shuan. 2004. Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195169344.001.0001
Nolan, Daniel, Greg Restall, and Caroline West. 2005. “Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83: 307–330. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400500191917
Olson, Jonas. 2014. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701934.001.0001
Prinz, Jesse. 2006. “The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments.” Philosophical Explorations 9: 29?43. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869790500492466
Rawls, John B. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Richardson, Henry S. 1998. “Truth and Ends in Dewey’s Pragmatism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28: 109?147. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1998.10717497
Sauer, Hanno. Forthcoming. “No Excuses for Moral Realism.” Unpublished Manuscript.
Svoboda, Toby. 2015. “Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 1: 1?25. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-46810047
Warnock, Geoffrey J. 1971. The Object of Morality. London: Methuen.
West, Caroline. 2010. “Business As Usual? The Error Theory, Internalism, and the Function of Morality.” In A World Without Values edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, 183?198. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_11
Williams, Bernard A. O. 1981. Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139165860
———. 2004. Truth and Truthfulness. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Published
2017-05-04
Issue
Section
Articles
How to Cite
Van Doorn, M. (2017). Mind-Independent Values Don’t Exist, But Moral Truth Does. Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism, 25(1), 5-24. https://doi.org/10.1558/eph.33214
