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MULAPARIYAYA SUTTA

The Root of all Dhammas

(translated by Nāṇamoli Thera)

1. Thus I heard.

On one occasion the Blessed One was living at Ukkatthā at the root of a King Sāla tree in the Subhaga Grove. There he addressed the bhikkhus thus “Bhikkhus”—“Venerable Sir” they replied. The Blessed One said this:

2. “Bhikkhus, I shall expound to you a discourse on the root of all dhammas; listen and heed well what I shall say.” “Yes, Venerable Sir” they replied. The Blessed One said this:

(The Ordinary Man)

3. Here, bhikkhus, an untaught ordinary man who has no regard for Noble Ones and is unconversant with their Dhamma and undisciplined in it, who has no regard for True Men and is unconversant with their Dhamma and undisciplined in it:

4. From earth he has a percept of earth; having had from earth a percept of earth, he conceives (that to be) earth, he conceives (that to be) in earth, he conceives (that to be apart) from earth, he conceives earth to be ‘mine’, he delights (a) in earth, Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

5. From water he has a percept of water; having had from water a percept of water, he conceives (that to be) water, he conceives (that to be) in water, he conceives (that to be apart) from water, he conceives water to be ‘mine’, he delights in water, Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

6. From fire he has a percept of fire; having had from fire a percept of fire, he conceives (that to be) fire, he conceives (that to be) in fire, he conceives (that to be apart) from fire, he conceives fire to be ‘mine’, he delights in fire. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

7. From air he has a percept of air; having had from air a percept of air, he conceives (that to be) air, he conceives (that to be) in air, he conceives (that to be apart) from air, he conceives air to be ‘mine’, he delights in air. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

8. From beings he has a percept of beings; having had from beings a percept of beings, he conceives (that to be) beings, he conceives (that to be) in beings, he conceives (that to be apart) from beings, he conceives

beings to be 'mine', he delights in beings. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

9. From gods he has a percept of gods, having had from gods a percept of gods, he conceives (that to be) gods, he conceives (that to be) in gods, he conceives (that to be apart) from gods, he conceives gods to be 'mine', he delights in gods, Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

10. From the Lord of the Race (Pajāpati) (b) he has a percept of the Lord of the Race; having had from the Lord of the Race a percept of the Lord of the Race, he conceives (that to be) the Lord of the Race, he conceives (that to be) in the Lord of the Race, he conceives (that to be apart) from the Lord of the Race, he conceives the Lord of the Race to be 'mine', he delights in the Lord of the Race. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

11. From the Divinity (Brahmā) he has a percept of the Divinity; having had from the Divinity a percept of the Divinity, he conceives (that to be) the Divinity, he conceives (that to be) in the Divinity, he conceives (that to be apart) from the Divinity, he conceives the Divinity to be 'mine', he delights in the Divinity. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

12. From those of Streaming Radiance (Ābhassara) he has a percept of those of Streaming Radiance; having had from those of Streaming Radiance a percept of those of Streaming Radiance, he conceives (that to be) those of Streaming Radiance, he conceives (that to be) in those of Streaming Radiance, he conceives (that to be apart) from those of Streaming Radiance, he conceives those of Streaming Radiance to be 'mine', he delights in those of Streaming Radiance. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

13. From those of Refulgent Glory (Subhakinha) he has a percept of those of Refulgent Glory; having had from those of Refulgent Glory a percept of those of Refulgent Glory, he conceives (that to be) those of Refulgent Glory, he conceives (that to be) in those of Refulgent Glory, he conceives (that to be apart) from those of Refulgent Glory, he conceives those of Refulgent Glory to be 'mine', he delights in those of Refulgent Glory. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

14. From those of Great Fruit (Vehapphala) he has a percept of those of Great Fruit; having had from those of Great Fruit a percept of those of Great Fruit, he conceives (that to be) those of Great Fruit, he conceives (that to be) in those of Great Fruit, he conceives (that to be apart) from those of Great Fruit, he conceives those of Great Fruit to be 'mine', he delights in those of Great Fruit. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

15. From Transcendent Being (c) (Abhibhu) he has a percept of Transcendent Being; having had from Transcendent Being a percept of Transcendent Being, he conceives (that to be) Transcendent Being, he conceives (that to be) in Transcendent Being, he conceives (that to

be apart) from Transcendent Being, he conceives Transcendent Being to be 'mine', he delights in Transcendent Being. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

16. From the base consisting of infinity of space he has a percept of the base consisting of infinity of space; having had from the base consisting of infinity of space a percept of the base consisting of infinity of space, he conceives (that to be) the base consisting of infinity of space, he conceives (that to be) in the base consisting of infinity of space, he conceives (that to be apart) from the base consisting of infinity of space, he conceives the base consisting of infinity of space to be 'mine', he delights in the base consisting of infinity of space. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

17. From the base consisting of infinity of consciousness, he has a percept of the base consisting of infinity of consciousness; having had from the base consisting of infinity of consciousness a percept of the base consisting of infinity of consciousness, he conceives (that to be) the base consisting of infinity of consciousness, he conceives (that to be) in the base consisting of infinity of consciousness, he conceives (that to be apart) from the base consisting of infinity of consciousness, he conceives the base consisting of infinity of consciousness to be 'mine', he delights in the base consisting of infinity of consciousness. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

18. From the base consisting of nothingness he has a percept of the base consisting of nothingness; having had from the base consisting of nothingness a percept of the base consisting of nothingness, he conceives (that to be) the base consisting of nothingness, he conceives (that to be) in the base consisting of nothingness, he conceives (that to be apart) from the base consisting of nothingness, he conceives the base consisting of nothingness to be 'mine', he delights in the base consisting of nothingness. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

19. From the base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception he has a percept of the base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception; having had from the base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception a percept of the base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, he conceives (that to be) the base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, he conceives (that to be) in the base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, he conceives (that to be apart) from the base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, he conceives the base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception to be 'mine', he delights in the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

20. From the seen he has a percept of the seen; having had from the seen a percept of the seen, he conceives (that to be) the seen, he conceives (that to be) in the seen, he conceives (that to be apart) from the seen, he conceives the seen to be 'mine', he delights in the seen. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

21. From the heard he has a percept of the heard; having had from the heard a percept of the heard, he conceives (that to be) the heard, he conceives (that to be) in the heard, he conceives (that to be apart) from the heard, he conceives the heard to be 'mine', he delights in the heard. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

22. From the sensed he has a percept of the sensed; having had from the sensed a percept of the sensed, he conceives (that to be) the sensed, he conceives (that to be) in the sensed, he conceives (that to be apart) from the sensed, he conceives the sensed to be 'mine', he delights in the sensed. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

23. From the cognised he has a percept of the cognised; having had from the cognised a percept of the cognised, he conceives (that to be) the cognised, he conceives (that to be) in the cognised, he conceives (that to be apart) from the cognised, he conceives the cognised to be 'mine', he delights in the cognised. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

24. From unity he has a percept of unity; having had from unity a percept of unity, he conceives (that to be) unity, he conceives (that to be) in unity, he conceives (that to be apart) from unity, he conceives unity to be 'mine', he delights in unity. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

25. From difference (d) he has a percept of difference; having had from difference a percept of difference, he conceives (that to be) difference, he conceives (that to be) in difference, he conceives (that to be apart) from difference, he conceives difference to be 'mine', he delights in difference. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

26. From all he has a percept of all; having had from all a percept of all, he conceives (that to be) all, he conceives (that to be) in all, he conceives (that to be apart) from all, he conceives all to be 'mine', he delights in all. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

27. From Nibbāna he has a percept of Nibbāna; having had from Nibbāna a percept of Nibbāna, he conceives (that to be) Nibbāna, he conceives (that to be) in Nibbāna, he conceives (that to be apart) from Nibbāna, he conceives Nibbāna to be 'mine', he delights in Nibbāna. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

(One In The Higher Training)

28. Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is one in the (higher) training, whose mind has not yet reached (deliverance) and who is still aspiring to the supreme surcease of bondage:

29. From earth he has direct knowledge of earth; having had from earth direct knowledge of earth, he ought not to conceive (that to be) earth, he ought not to conceive (that to be) in earth, he ought not to conceive (that to be apart) from earth, he ought not to conceive earth to be 'mine', he ought to know fully, I say.

30-51. From water...fire...air...beings...gods...Lord of the Race... Divinity...those of Streaming Radiance...those of Refulgent Glory... those of Great Fruit...Transcendent Being...infinity of space...infinity... of consciousness...nothingness...neither-perception-nor-non-perception ...seen...heard...sensed...cognised...unity ...difference...all...He ought to know fully, I say.

52. From Nibbāna he has direct knowledge of Nibbāna; having had from Nibbāna direct knowledge of Nibbāna, he ought not to conceive (that to be) Nibbāna, he ought not to conceive (that to be) in Nibbāna, he ought not to conceive (that to be apart) from Nibbāna, he ought to conceive Nibbāna to be 'mine', he ought not to delight in Nibbāna. Why is that? He ought to know fully, I say.

(The Arahant—I)

53. Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is an arahant with the taints exhausted, who has lived out the life, done what was to be done, laid down the burden reached the highest goal, destroyed the fetters of being, and is rightly liberated through final knowledge:

54. From earth he has direct knowledge of earth: having had from earth direct knowledge of earth, he does not conceive (that to be) earth, he does not conceive (that to be) in earth, he does not conceive (that to be apart) from earth, he does not conceive earth to be 'mine', he does not delight in earth. Why is that? He has fully known, I say.

55-76. From water...fire...air...beings...gods...Lord of the Race... Divinity...those of streaming Radiance...those of Refulgent Glory...those of Great Fruit...Transcendent Being...infinity of space...infinity of consciousness ... nothingness...neither-perception-nor-non-perception.. seen...heard ...sensed... cognised...unity...difference...all...He has fully known, I say.

77. From Nibbāna he has direct knowledge of Nibbāna; having had from Nibbāna direct knowledge of Nibbāna, he does not conceive (that to be) Nibbāna, he does not conceive (that to be) in Nibbāna, he does not conceive (that to be apart) from Nibbāna, he does not conceive Nibbāna to be 'mine', he does not delight in Nibbāna. Why is that? He has fully known, I say.

(The Arahant—II)

78. Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is an arahant...rightly liberated through final knowledge:

79. From earth he has direct knowledge of earth...he does not delight in earth. Why is that? Because of lustlessness with the exhaustion of lust.

80-102. From water...from Nibbāna...Why is that? Because of lustlessness with the exhaustion of lust.

(The Arahant—III)

103. Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is an arahant,...rightly liberated through final knowledge:

104. From earth he has direct knowledge of earth...he does not delight in earth. Why is that? Because of hatelessness with the exhaustion of hate.

105-127. From water...from Nibbāna...Why is that? Because of hatelessness with exhaustion of hate.

(The Arahant—IV)

128. Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is an arahant,...rightly liberated through final knowledge:

129. From earth he has direct knowledge of earth...he does not delight in earth. Why is that? Because of delusionlessness with the exhaustion of delusion.

130-152. From water...from Nibbāna...Why is that? Because of delusionlessness with the exhaustion of delusion.

(The Tathagata—I)

153. Bhikkhus, a Tathāgata, arahant and Fully Enlightened One:

154. From earth he has direct knowledge of earth; having had from earth direct knowledge of earth, he does not conceive (that to be) earth he does not conceive (that to be) in earth, he does not conceive (that to be apart) from earth, he does conceive earth to be 'mine', he does not, delight in earth. Why is that? A Tathāgata has fully known to the end, I say.

155-177 From water...from Nibbāna ...Why is that? A Tathāgata has fully known to the end, I say.

(The Tathagata—II)

178. Bhikkhus, a Tathāgata, arahant and Fully Enlightened One:

179. From earth he has direct knowledge of earth; having had from earth direct knowledge of earth, he does not conceive (that to be) earth, he does not conceive (that to be) in earth, he does not conceive (that to be apart) from earth, he does not conceive earth to be 'mine', he does not delight in earth, Why is that? A Tathāgata knows that delight is the root of suffering, and that with being there is birth, and the ageing and death of whatever is; and therefore it is with craving's exhaustion, fading out, cessation, being given up and relinquished in all ways that he has discovered the supreme Full Enlightenment, I say.

180-202. From water...fire...air...beings...gods...Lord of the Race...Divinity...those of Streaming Radiance...those of Refulgent Glory...those of Great Fruit...Transcendent Being...infinity of space...infinity

of consciousness...nothingness...neither—perception -nor-non-perception ...seen...heard...sensed...cognised...unity...difference ... all ... Nibbāna ...Why is that? A Tathāgata knows that delight is the root of suffering, and that with being there is birth, and the ageing and death of whatever is: and therefore it is with craving's exhaustion, fading out, cessation, being given up and relinquished in all ways that he has discovered the supreme Full Enlightenment, I say.

203. That is what the Blessed One said. Those bhikkhus did not delight in the Blessed One's words.

Notes

§2. According to the Comy the rendering should be 'a discourse on the root of all dhammas', and no connection is made between the word *sabba* (all) in *sabbadhamma* and *sabba* in §26, which has a special emphasis in Sutta 49.

§3: The following scheme shows the differences between the four kinds of person.

The ordinary man (<i>puthujjana</i>)	has a percept (<i>sañjānāti</i>)	conceives (that to be) (<i>maññati</i>)	has not fully known (<i>aṇiññātaṃ</i>)
One in the higher training (<i>sekha</i>)	has direct know- ledge (<i>abhiññā-</i> <i>ti</i>)	cught not to conceive (<i>mā-</i> <i>maññi</i>)	ought to fully know (<i>pariññey-</i> <i>ya</i>)
The arahant	„	does not conce- ive (<i>na maññati</i>)	has fully known (<i>pariññātaṃ</i>)
The Tathāgata	„	„	has fully known to the end (<i>pariññātaṃ</i>)

§4. *Paṭhavim paṭhavito sañjānāti*—'From earth he has a percept of earth': this presents the first of many problems, most of which seem to be ontological. This ablative construction would normally be freely renderable by 'he perceives earth as earth' (i.e. perceives it for what it really is'); but that takes the ablative in a different sense to the one that follows (*paṭhavito maññati*—he conceives (that to be apart) from earth), which seems hard to justify, and perhaps not necessary. The strongest argument against this is that 'perceives' (*sañjānāti*) is used only of the ordinary man. Consequently it must be taken that in the act of perceiving, a basic slight distortion takes place (cf. definition of *saññā*—perception in Visuddhi-magga Ch. XIV as *abhinivesa*—interpretation), which is absent in *abhiññā*—direct knowledge. The perceiving has already made an interpretation from the base object of *viññāṇa* (*bakiddhāyatana*). Perceiving has the utraquistic (both ways/kinds) sense of the act of perceiving and the percept, and that is deliberately implied here, apparently.

Maññati—‘conceives’: whatever the etymology, *maññati* is semantically inseparable from *māna* (conceit) as well as *manati* (to measure). For other contexts see *yena yena hi maññati tato taṃ hoti aññathā* (Sutta-Nipāta 757), *maññussava* (M 140§§ 25-6), *Yena kho avuso lokasmim lokasaññi hoti lokamañi ayaṃ vacceti ariyassa vinaye loko. Kena c’āvuso lokasmim lokasaññi hoti lokamañi?* (Cakkhunā... (S vol IV 95—XXXV 116—this closely concerns the present Sutta), and *cakkhuṃ na maññeyya, cakkhusmim na maññeyya, cakkhuto na maññeyya, cakkhu’me’ ti na maññeyya; rūpe na maññeyya...* (etc, with 4 modes up to *vedanā*)...*sabbaṃ na maññeyya, sabbasmim na maññeyya, sabbato na maññeyya, sabbaṃ ‘me’ ti na maññeyya. so evaṃ amaññamāno na kiñci loke upādiyati...* (S. vol IV 65—XXXV 90) See Vibhaṅga 355-6 and S iii 130.

§4f. In rendering the 4 *maññati* phrases, the first difficulty is the use of the transitive *maññati* with no object except in the first phrase (*paṭhavim maññati*). The Comy suggests a rendering such: ‘he conceives (self as) earth, he conceives (self as) in earth, he conceives (self as) apart from earth, he conceives (self as) ‘mine’, ... and it attempts an equation with the 4 modes of *sakkāyaditthi* given for each of the 5 aggregates in Sutta 44 §7. But this is perhaps rather procrustean. It may do for the ordinary man, who has *sakkāyaditthi* (embodiment-view) but that is abandoned by the one in the higher training (*sekha*), who, however, still has *asmimāna* (the conceit ‘I am’) which is only, abandoned by the arahant. He still has the sense of ‘being’ with ‘being self’. In Sutta 44 the modes in which ideas of self (*attā*), already clearly formed, are treatable, is handled; but in the present Sutta (and in Sutta 49) the treatment is on a more general level and there is no specific mention of *attā*. The conceiving is simply done on the basis of the percept. *Attā* is no doubt implied here but not yet explicitly stated. Since, however, a subject is necessary in the rendering the only safe one seems to be one drawn from the Sutta itself without introducing outside ideas, namely, the percepts. (Also it makes sense not only here but throughout).

The conceiving can also be taken as showing the grammatical behaviour of the mind towards what it has (mis-) perceived: it conceives its earth-percept in the accusative, locative, or ablative relation, or as a possession (or as an object to take interest in, positive or negative).

But the most important aspect of this structure is the ontological one. How it is relevant in this Sutta appears more clearly from the use of *nāpāhosi* in Sutta 49 instead of *na maññati*; for it indicates that one of the functions of *maññanā* is to endow percept with being.

When compressed, the Comy’s explanation is: the ordinary man perceives with some degree of error by taking ‘earth’ according to common usage. On the basis of that he then first of all conceives earth with the habitual diversification (*papañca*) effected by craving, conceit and view, taking it as respectively ‘I am earth’ or ‘my earth’ or ‘another is earth’ or ‘another’s earth’; or else he respectively likes the object, has the conceit that it is better or worse than another and equates it with or differentiates it from, the soul. Next, he ‘conceives’ that he or another, is ‘in earth’, or ‘there is the impediment of owning in earth,’ or else he conceives

that his self is ‘in earth’. Next he ‘conceives’ that his or another’s self is different ‘from earth’. Lastly, he ‘conceives’ earth as “mine” ‘simply out of craving.

§8: *Bhūte bhūtato sañjānāto...bhūtato maññati*: the use of the ablative suffix—*to* in a plural sense is unusual, but it cannot be taken in any other way. Such a rendering as ‘recognises the beings from nature (i.e. from the fact of being nature)’ (PED under *bhūta*) is quite untenable. This emphasises the use of the ablative—*to* rather than the more usual—*ā*, *-asmā*, *-asmā* (pl *-ehi*), and seems a further indication in favour of the view that the two occurrences in each clause—here *bhūtato sañjānāti...bhūtato maññati* have the same significance (i.e. ‘from’) rather than ‘as’ in the first case and ‘apart from’ in the second.

§26: For *sabba*—‘all’: see Sutta 49.

§28: For *sekha*—‘one in the higher training’ see Sutta 53. The term applies to the first seven of the ‘Eight Persons’. None of them have *sakkāyaditthi* (embodiment—view) but all have still *asmī—māna* (‘the conceit I am’).

§29f: The prohibitive *mā maññati* can only signify that in the case of those in the higher training, they can but ought not to, indulge in conceiving. They can do so because they still have *asmī—māna*, which is only eliminated by arahantship. This should show that, in spite of what the Comy says, the fourfold *sakkāyaditthi* in Sutta 44 is not directly connectable, for a *sekha* does not have *sakkāyaditthi* at all.

§29: N.B. *abhiñānāto*—‘has direct knowledge’ instead of *sañjānāti*—‘has perception of’—*Mā maññi*—‘ought not to conceive’: the form is the normal negative imperative or prohibitive.

§154: Reading *pariññātantaṃ*—‘fully known to the end’: with Comy, etc.

§155: Emphasises the ontological aspect.

§203: So all editions, apparently, except the P.T.S. edn.

General Notes

(I) For *abhiññeyyatā* and *pariññeyyatā*, see Vbh. 426 and VbhA. 522.

(II) For *asmī*, see S. iii 46 and 128-30. (The latter confirms the differences between the *puṭhujjana*, *sekha* and *asekha*, with *attā* and *asmimāna*).

(III) For conceiving and being see *L’Etre et le Néant* (Sartre) p. 122.

(IV) *Brhādāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (Compare M I, and S. XXXV 30, 31) III 7.3ff. (e)

3. *Yaḥ pṛthiviyāṃ tistham pṛthiviyā antaraḥ, yaḥ pṛthivī na ved, yasya pṛthivī śarīram yaḥ pṛthivim antaro yamayati, eśata ātmāntaryāmyamrtah.* (He who inhabits the earth is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, and who controls the earth from within, this is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal Self).

4. ...āpo... 5. agni... 6. antariksa... 7. vāyo... 8. dyaur... 9. ādīto...
10. diśo... 11. candratāraka... 12. ākāśo... 13. tamo... 14. tejas... (water,
fire, sky, air, heaven, sun, quarters, moon and stars, space, darkness,
light).

This much with reference to the gods. Now with reference to beings,
(*ity ādhi daivataṃ ath' ādhi dhūtam*):

15. *sarveṣu bhūteṣu tiṣṭhan* (all existing beings) Now with reference
to oneself:

16. *prañāna*... 17. *vāc*... 18. *caṣur*... 19. *śrotam* 20. *mano*... 21. *tvac*...
22. *viññānam*... 23. *śrotas*. (breath, speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, intellect,
sexual organ),

IV.3.7.

Katama ātmē'ti? Yo'yam viññānamayah prāṇeṣu hṛdyantarjyotiṃ puruṣaḥ

(Śankara's Commentary) The locative case in the term 'in the midst^t
of the organs' (*prāṇeṣu*) indicates that the self is different from the organs
as 'a rock in the midst of trees' indicates only nearness: for there is doubt
about the identity or difference of the self from the organs. "In the
midst of the organs" means "different from the organs": for that which
is in the midst of certain other things is of course different from them, as a
tree in the midst of rocks. "Within the heart (—intellect)" indicates
that the self is different from the modifications of the intellect." (Cf.
MA. Sutta I *Paṭhavito...āpato...tejato...vāyato mannaṭi ti vadantenarūpato*
añño attā'ti siddhattā... Rūpavantaṃ vā attānaṃ, attani vārūpaṃ saman-
passati' ti vuttaṃ hoti.

IV. 45.

Sa vā ayam ātmā brahma viññānamayo manomayah prāṇamaya' caṣurmayah
śrotamayah prthivīmaya āpamayo vāyumaya ākāśamayas tejomayo atejomaya kāmā-
maya' kāmamaya... sarvamaya...

"Verily this Self is Brahma consisting of knowledge, of mind, of life-
force, of eye, of ear, of earth, of water, of wind, of space, of power and
not of power, of lust and not of lust...consisting of all..."

(V) With reference to § 153 f, (the Tathāgata), Nānamoli translated
the following Sutta (A iv 24), the Kālakārāma Sutta: (f)

On one occasion the Blessed One was living at Sāketa in the Kālaka
Park. There he addressed the bhikkhus thus:

1. "Bhikkhus, whatever in this world with its deities, Māras and
Divinities, in this generation with its monks and divines, with its kings
and men, is seen, heard, sensed or cognised, is reached, sought out, or
followed with the mind, that I know.

2. Bhikkhus, whatever in this world...with its kings and men, is
seen, heard, sensed or cognised, is reached, sought out, or followed with
the mind, that I have directly-known, that is recognised by the Tathāgata,
that the Tathāgata does not use as a basis.

3. Bhikkhus, were I to say of whatever in the world... with its kings
and men, is seen, heard, sensed or cognised, is reached, sought out, or
followed, with the mind, that I know it not, that would be falsely spoken
by me; and were I to say of it that I know it and know it not, that would
be the same; and were I to say of it that I neither know it nor know it
not, that would be incorrect on my part.

4. So, bhikkhus, having seen what can be seen, the Tathāgata does
not conceive what is seen (to *be*), he does not conceive what is unseen
(to *be*), he does not conceive what can be seen (to *be*), he does not conceive
a seer (to *be*); having heard what can be heard...having sensed what can
be sensed...having cognised what can be cognised, the Tathāgata does
not conceive what is cognised (to *be*), he does not conceive what is un-
cognised (to *be*), he does not conceive what can be cognised (to *be*), he
does not conceive a cogniser (to *be*).

5. So, bhikkhus, towards *dhammas* which can be seen, heard, sensed,
cognised, the Tathāgata being equipoised remains equipoised; and there
is no other equipoise that is beyond or superior than that equipoise,
I say.

Notes by Ven. Khantipalo

- Later changed to 'relish'. 'Delights' (*abhinandati*) implies craving
(*taṇhā*).
- Identified by the Comy with Māra, the ruler of the realms of sensual
desire.
- Explained in the Comy as those things which consist of subtle form
only but have no perception (*asaññasatta*)—a class found in the
Brahma world.
- Usually translated as 'diversity'.
- For this passage (p. 50 fn.) and comments on M 1, see Bhikkhu
Nāṇanda, *Concept and Reality*, BPS, Kandy 1971, p. 45ft.
- For an exposition of this Sutta, see Bhikkhu Nāṇanda, *The Magic
of the Mind*, BPS, Kandy 1974.

Editor

This translation was offered to the *Review* by Ven. Khantipālo who has
edited a further 90 *suttas* from the Majjhima Nikāya whose complete
translation was found amongst the papers left by the late English bhikkhu,
Nānamoli (1905-60). Ven. Khantipālo's anthology has recently been
published in three volumes by Mahāmakut, Bangkok, under the title,
A Treasury of the Buddha's Words, which will be reviewed in a future issue.

A comparison may be made with existing translations of this Sutta:
Mūlapariyāya Sutta. Suriyagoda Sumaṅgala. The Maha Bodhi Society,
Colombo 1908.
The First Fifty Discourses. Silācāra. Breslau and London 1912, repr.
Munich 1924
Further Dialogues of the Buddha I. Lord Chalmers. SBB. London 1926
The Middle Length Sayings I. I. B. Horner. PTS, London 1954, repr. 1976
The Lion's Roar. David Maurice, London 1962, New York 1967

THE MEANING OF "ABHIDHAMMA" IN THE PALI CANON

Terry C. Muck

Students of Theravāda Buddhist Philosophy usually find the third section of the three-part Pali Buddhist texts, the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, the hardest to understand. The first section of the Pali texts, the Vinaya Piṭaka, lists the rules by which Buddhist monks (bhikkhus) live. The second, the Sutta Piṭaka, contains the sermons and teachings of the Buddha. But the third, the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, consists of an analytical dissection of all reality into its constituent *dhammas*, or moments of being. To profit from this section of the Buddhist Canon the student must fully understand the fundamental teachings of the Buddha, teachings which are found in the Sutta Piṭaka.

A good place to begin a study of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka is with the word "abhidhamma" itself. An understanding of this word leads one to more fully understand why the Abhidhamma Piṭaka was written.

We will argue in this paper that "abhidhamma" translates into English best as "essence of the teaching". We arrive at this translation through a study of the various uses of the word "abhidhamma" in the Pali Canon. By studying these uses we can arrive at a consensus of what the early Buddhists were thinking when they used the word, and why they used it to name one of the sections of their authoritative

As a preliminary to this examination, we should look at what the two parts of this word, "abhi-" and "dhamma" mean separately. "Dhamma" has been translated into English many ways, due in part to its rather global meaning in the Pali texts, at times meaning the "way things are," or "the Buddha's teaching," or "the individual moments of being."¹ Each of these may be correct, and the diversity of meaning only serves to underscore the importance of the word "dhamma" in Buddhist philosophy. The general term "teaching" very often represents to word well and can be substituted provisionally in most cases.

The prefix "abhi-" determines the total meaning of "abhidhamma" and we need to examine its meaning more closely to understand the full word. Trying to determine the meaning of a prefix in Pali is a tenuous proposition. Warder says in his Pali grammar:

The prefixes are regarded as a separate part of speech in Pali (whose characteristic is that it cannot stand alone, but only be

prefixed to another word). The various verbs (and nouns), consisting of prefix plus root, have all to be learned separately as regards meanings. Although the separate prefixes and roots can be assigned meanings—usually rather broad and vague ones—the meaning of a prefix plus root cannot usually be accounted for adequately as simply the product of the two separate meanings.²

Buddhaghosa assigns some general meanings to the prefix "abhi" in *The Expositor*. He says it means "growth, proper attributes, reverence, clear differentiation, and surpassing worth."³ Rhys Davids, in the *Pali-English Dictionary*, says the primary meaning of "abhi-" is that of taking possession and mastering which, he says, leads to the figurative meaning of increasing or intensifying of the root word. These two scholars, of course, have arrived at these very similar opinions through a study of what the prefix "abhi-" does to a wide variety of words in the Pali texts. But, as Warder has pointed out, each word must be viewed in its own context. While we must accept this general intensifying function of "abhi-" for the "Dhamma", we are constrained to go further and examine just what this intensification does in the specific case of "abhidhamma."

Although "essence of the teaching" is the best translation of "abhidhamma", there have been several other renderings of the word in English translations of Pali Buddhist works. These previous translations do not seem to really get at the meaning of the word. While we would err in saying they are incorrect (because they all have a modicum of truth), there exist better words to translate "abhidhamma".

Buddhaghosa, when he does not identify the word with the Piṭaka, says it means "differentiation", apparently implying that one knows enough about the Dhamma to differentiate it from other sets of knowledge. He defines it in the phrase "abhidhamma, abhivinaya" as:

In sentences such as "he is able to master the abhidhamma, abhivinaya" it (abhi-) expresses differentiation; the sentence, that is to say means "He is able to master the Dhamma and Vinaya without confusing either with the other."⁴

None of these translations seem really to get at the meaning of "abhidhamma." To do that we must examine the uses of the word in the Pali canonical texts where the true meaning for the Theravāda Buddhist is found.

What does the word "abhidhamma" mean in the Pali Canon of Theravāda Buddhism? Immediately we can see two main usages. The word has a non-technical meaning which appears to go back to the very origins of the texts, the time of the Buddha or shortly thereafter.

1. So much research has been done on the meaning of "dhamma" that it is beyond the scope of this article to examine the question thoroughly. Suffice it to say that the term refers to everything as it really is, and because the Buddha recognised the way things really are, his teaching, which reflects that understanding, can be called Dhamma. See the following discussions: David Kalupahana, *Buddhist Philosophy* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976), pp. 81f.; Nyanatiloka, *Buddhist Dictionary* (Colombo: Lake House Press, 1972), s.v.; Walpola Rahula, *What the Buddha Taught* (New York: Grove Press, 1974), pp. 58f.

2. A. K. Warder, *Introduction to Pali* (London: Pali Text Society, 1974), p. 5.

3. pp. 24-25. All Pali canonical texts cited in this paper are English translations (unless otherwise noted) by the Pali Text Society (PTS) of London. Original Pali references can be gained from those texts. Years of publication are found in the bibliography.

4. *The Expositor* (PTS), p. 23.

However, before we can deal specifically with that meaning, the other usage must be properly understood. "Abhidhamma" has a technical meaning as a designation of one of the three main divisions of the Tipiṭaka, the threefold Pali Canon. In order to discern the non-technical meaning of "abhidhamma", we must be able to isolate and recognise when the technical meaning, a later usage, occurs in the texts. This discernment rests on the argument that the Abhidhamma Piṭaka represents an advanced (and thus later) development of the Theravāda doctrine.

As a title, "abhidhamma" refers to seven books highly respected by Buddhists past and present. Their respect evidence itself in two ways: historical study and veneration, and an attempt to ascribe these books to the Buddha himself. We read in the Cūlavamsa, the second portion of the great chronicle of Ceylon, the Mahāvamsa, of King Kassapa V (10th century A.C.) who had the whole of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka inscribed on gold plates, and who had the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, the first book of this seven book collection, set in jewels.⁵ A more modern Buddhist scholar, Cassius Pereira (the late Bhikkhu Kassapa,) describes the Abhidhamma Piṭaka this way:

It is to such a student (one seeking the true vision of a Buddha) that the Abhidhamma comes as a wonderful revelation, for even the Abhidhamma can only be that, a revelation and not a realisation to a worldling, however high he may have climbed up this ladder of knowledge. Here he feels he at last enjoys a picture of the Truth. It is not seeing truth face to face, it is a picture; but it is a true picture, a glimpse, however faint, of the Truth that the Noble Ones have attained.⁶

Because Theravādins recognize Truth in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, they believe in its authoritative nature, and since there exists a tradition that only Enlightened Ones teach Abhidhamma, Theravāda tradition claims the Buddha taught the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. Buddhaghosa tells us in *The Expositor* that the Buddha realised and understood Abhidhamma at the foot of the bo-tree on the full moon day of Vesākha. He first taught it to the Tāvātimsa devas, for only those freed from the intoxicants can understand it. Probationers and good worldlings may attempt to learn Abhidhamma but will not do so until they attain freedom.⁷

Nyānatiloka Mahāthera, in his *Guide Through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, says that like other writings of this early Buddhist period, the seven books of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka cannot be precisely dated. Internal evidence indicates that the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, the Vibhanga, and the Paṭṭhāna are the oldest and were probably recited at the Second Great Council of Arahants, held in the first quarter of the 4th century B.C. The Dhātu-Kathā, the Puggala-Paññatti, and Yamaka were recited at the

Third Great Council of Arahants, held during Asoka's reign. The seventh book, the Kathāvatthu, is a recording of the activities of that Third Council, attempting to refute schismatics. Thus Nyānatiloka concludes, the Abhidhamma books were already fixed at a date not later than 250 B.C.⁸

While modern historical-critical research has not been exercised on the Buddhist Canon with any systematic intensity, it seems probable that a study of this sort would push the date of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka even further forward, to around 100 A.C. when these materials finally reached a written form in Ceylon. Where critical research has been done, 100 A.C. is usually seen as the latest date and 100 B.C. as the earliest.⁹ We find ourselves with three positions regarding the date of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka: The traditional position ascribing it to the Buddha himself, a conservative position claiming a date of around 250 B.C., and a liberal position marking 100 A.C. as the most realistic date.

Some scholars of Buddhism in attempting to resolve this issue without doing violence to the Theravāda tradition, claim that the Buddha only taught the outline or table of contents (*mātika*) of the Abhidhamma, and that the actual writing of the text was done by later disciples. Proponents of this view point to Buddhaghosa's explanation in *The Expositor* concerning the validity of claiming the Kathāvatthu, an obviously late composition, to be an authentic work of the Buddha. Buddhaghosa says:

Now when he (the Buddha) laid down the *mātika* he foresaw that, two hundred and eighteen years after his death, Tissa Moggali's son, seated in the midst of one thousand bhikkhus, would elaborate the Kathāvatthu to the extent of the Dīgha-Nikāya.¹⁰

A. K. Warder defines *mātika* as "an enumeration of the main divisions of the Buddhist system of training and of the main categories of the Buddhist philosophy, subsequently elaborated by some schools into the books called collectively Abhidhamma."¹¹ While this is interesting speculation, it really does not represent either Buddhaghosa's nor the Theravādin's (usually one and the same) position. Buddhaghosa claims quite explicitly the Abhidhamma Piṭaka existed at the time the other canonical works came into being (the time of the Buddha), and uses the *mātika* explanation solely in the case of the Kathāvatthu, because of its contrary nature (it claims to report the arguments of the sects at the Third Council, some two hundred years after the Buddha's death). There is no textual reason to extend the argument to cover the rest of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka works. It is true that *mātikas* exist for some of the

8. Nyānatiloka, *Guide*, p. xi.

9. Edward Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought* (New York: Barnes and Noble Co., 1933), pp. 158ff.

10. *The Expositor* (PTS), p. 6.

11. A. K. Warder, "The Pali Canon and Its Commentaries as an Historical Record", in *Historians of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon*, ed. C. H. Phillips (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

5. *Maāvamsa* (PTS), pp. xliv, xlviii, 107ff., 141-142.

6. Nyānatiloka Mahāthera, *Guide Through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka* (Kandy, Ceylon: Buddhist Publication Society, 1971) p. xiii.

7. *The Expositor* (PTS), pp. 40f.

other Abhidhamma works (Dhammasaṅgaṇī, Dhātu-Kathā, Puggala-Paññatti) but there is no evidence to justify separating these *mātikas* from the main works. In other words, they are nothing more than tables of contents for those works.

A more reasonable argument appears when we consider the nature of this tradition making the Buddha the author of books written down three or four centuries after his death. The purpose of the tradition rests in an attempt to sanction the Abhidhamma Piṭaka as a valid aid in finding the truth; indeed, it represents the highest textual achievement of the religious tradition. In a traditional sense, the Buddha may be seen as the author of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka because more than any other writing it does point to the path which his teaching set forth. We find the reality of the Dhamma in the Abhidhamma, although it is not itself the Dhamma. Further, the words and teachings of the Buddha represent authority to Theravādins because they accurately describe the "way things are" and not simply because the Buddha taught them. This unique historical sense, which differs from the Judeo-Christian need to firmly root God's actions in specific history, allows us to understand the Buddhist's desire to ascribe the later Abhidhamma Piṭaka works to the Buddha and at the same time accept the fruits of historical-critical research.¹² It leaves us free from a historical-critical point of view to accept the later date of composition of the texts without any injustice to the reality expressed by the traditional viewpoint.

The consequences of this later date of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka for our study of the earlier, non-technical meaning of "abhidhamma" lie in the evaluation of the seventeen occurrences¹³ of the term in the Sutta Piṭaka and the Vinaya Piṭaka. Our first task in trying to determine the meaning of "abhidhamma" consists of removing the passages where "abhidhamma" refers to the later third of the Tipiṭaka. Of the seventeen occurrences, four appear to be used in this technical sense.

All four appear in the Vinaya Piṭaka in sections which represent later additions to the original text.¹⁴ The Parivara, the Abhidhamma-like summary of the Vinaya Piṭaka, probably written in Ceylon, hold one of these, a passage which attributes all three sections of the Tipiṭaka to the great lion (the Buddha).¹⁵ The Old Commentary (*padabhājanīya*), an exegetical explanation of the words used in the statement of each rule, contains two references to Abhidhamma which obviously mean the

third division of the Tipiṭaka.¹⁶ The Old Commentary has become part of the standard Vinaya text and probably did not become fixed until the text reached written form in Ceylon. The final case to be considered is found in one of the word keys which frequently follow sections of the Vinaya added later to the text as mnemonic devices. This one is at the end of the "Great Section" of the Mahāvagga.¹⁷ These four uses of "abhidhamma" may all be considered later additions to the text and as such do not affect the early meaning of "abhidhamma."¹⁸

Of the thirteen remaining instances of "abhidhamma", all used in the non-technical, early sense, nine occur in the phrase, "abhidhamma, abhivinaya."¹⁹ All nine are used to describe a virtuous bhikkhu or what a virtuous bhikkhu studies. Five of the nine occur in a formula saying:

He loves the Dhamma, the utterance of it is dear to him, he finds exceeding joy in the teaching of both *abhidhamma* and *abhivinaya*.²⁰

Two of the nine occur in a simile describing good bhikkhus, used twice in the *Gradual Sayings*. Good bhikkhus resemble good colts with regard to speed (four noble truths), good proportions (offerings), and beauty (*abhidhamma* and *abhivinaya*).²¹ In the *Middle Length Sayings*, the Gulissāni Sutta, a sutta which gives rules for forest dwelling bhikkhus, bhikkhus who choose to dwell in the forest should study *abhidhamma* and *abhivinaya* in order to justify their withdrawal from society.²² The ninth occurrence appears in the Vinaya in a section describing the qualities a bhikkhu should have in order to ordain younger bhikkhus. He should be able

16. *Book of the Discipline* (PTS), III, pp. 42, 415.

17. *Book of the Discipline* (PTS), IV, p. 171.

18. The question naturally arises: Who added these insertions? Although this question lies beyond the scope of our task here, we can make two observations. First, it is instructive that all four occur in the Vinaya because we remember that the Buddha not only changed certain portions of the Vinaya during his lifetime, but at the time of his death instructed Ananda to allow changes in the minor precepts as new conditions demanded (see *Dialogues of the Buddha* (PTS), II, p. 171). As the Abhidhamma became an accepted part of Buddhist monastic tradition, Vinaya rules and instructions would become necessary regarding its use. Secondly, a logical selection for the later redactor would be Buddhaghosa, the fifth century A.C. commentator in Ceylon. In his commentaries on the Sutta Piṭaka, Buddhaghosa frequently identifies the non-technical early use of "abhidhamma" with the later Piṭaka of the same name (see for example, the *Vinaya Commentary* (*Samantapāsādikā*), pp. 861, 742; *Dialogues of the Buddha*, III, p. 246n.; *Middle Length Sayings Commentary*, II, p. 256, III, p. 185, IX, p. 29). He obviously had an interest in reading back into these early texts this later developed body of doctrine. That he does not appear to play the role of redactor with the Sutta as he (perhaps) did with the Vinaya, but limits himself to the commentaries, may be seen as a reflection of his different attitudes to the two branches of scripture.

19. *Dialogues of the Buddha* (PTS), III, p. 246; *Gradual Sayings* (PTS), I, p. 267, IV, p. 266, V, pp. 19, 64, 139, 217; *Middle Length Sayings* (PTS), II, p. 145; *Book of the Discipline* (PTS), IV, 84.

20. *Dialogues of the Buddha* (PTS), III, p. 246; *Gradual Sayings* (PTS), V, pp. 19, 64, 139, 217, 201, 339.

21. I, p. 267, IV, p. 266.

22. *Middle Length Sayings* (PTS), II, p. 145.

12. One of the most telling arguments regarding the late date of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka is presented by Maurice Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1933), II, p. 15. He says, "Doubts against the *Abhidharmapiṭaka* are justifiable, because, with the exception of the Vibhajjavādins, only the Sarvāstivādins have a corresponding *Abhidharmapiṭaka* and the latter contains totally different texts from the Pāli *Abhidharmapiṭaka*." As Winternitz also points out, this is not true of Sutta and Vinaya which have close parallels among the early sects. This would indicate the Abhidhamma Piṭaka as having been produced by the Theravādins after the great schism of the second century B.C.

13. According to the *Pāli Tipiṭakam Concordance*, ed. F. L. Woodward and E. M. Hare (London: Luzac and Co., 1956), I, s.v.

14. E. Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya* (Rome 1956).

15. *Book of the Discipline* (PTS), VI, p. 123.

to train pupils in *abhisamācārika* (conduct), *adhibrahmacariyika* (brahma-faring), *abhidhamma*, and *abhivāyaya*.²³

What does the phrase “abhidhamma, abhivāyaya” mean?²⁴ We can be quite sure that the two words refer to the early two-fold division of the Buddha’s teaching, the Dhamma and Vinaya. The Buddha himself distinguished between his discourses and the special organisational rules he was finally compelled to draw up when increasing numbers of follower came up between bhikkhus. This distinction between Dhamma and Vinaya was formalised at the First Council held immediately following the Buddha’s death, where Upāli recited Vinaya and Ananda recited Dhamma. The question for these usages now becomes what does the prefix “abhi-” do to these words?

Our most important clues in determining the meaning of “abhidhamma, abhivāyaya” lie in the almost uniform contexts in which the phrase occurs, the general meaning of the prefix “abhi-”, and the one divergent context where it appears in the Vinaya Piṭaka. We have examined the uniform contexts where the phrase “abhidhamma, abhivāyaya” occurs and from this study know “abhidhamma” refers to something all virtuous bhikkhus can and should comprehend. We have also seen that the prefix “abhi-” generally intensifies its root word; in this case it clearly defines Buddhist doctrine. The one divergent context we must now look at occurs in the Vinaya Piṭaka (IV: 84). Even this context refers to what qualities a good bhikkhu should have but it talks of a special bhikkhu, the preceptor, the instructor of novices. The passage says a preceptor should be able to train a novice in *abhisamācārika* (fundamentals of moral life), *adhibrahmacariyika* (fundamentals of the brahma life), *abhidhamma*, and *abhivāyaya*. We can legitimately extend the meaning of these first two words to the second pair so that they read fundamentals of doctrine and fundamentals of monastic discipline. We can do this not only because of the obvious parallelism but because this is what we would expect a teacher to be able to impart to a young recruit: fundamentals.

What word can we find that covers these ingredients: a trait of all good bhikkhus, and the intensified, clearly defined teaching which is at the same time fundamental to the Buddhist life? It seems a good to represent this rich meaning of “abhidhamma” is “essence of the teaching.”

The “essence of the teaching” is accessible to all to a certain degree. We saw earlier that “abhidhamma” when applied to the Piṭaka refers to an advanced body of doctrine that only a privileged few were able to master.²⁵ But the phrase as used in the Sutta Piṭaka and the Vinaya

23. *Book of the Discipline* (PTS), IV, p. 84.

24. See also I. B. Horner, “Abhidhamma, Abhivāyaya,” *IHQ* XII, No. 3, (September 1941).

25. Walpola Rahula, in his book *History of Buddhism in Ceylon* (Colombo, Ceylon: M. D. Gunasena & Co., 1956), says, “Proficiency in the Abhidhamma, which exalted a person to the revered position of a philosopher, was difficult achievement coveted by all.” (p. 291)

Pitaka applies to all virtuous bhikkhus. All virtuous bhikkhus were expected to make great strides in mastering the inward substance of what the Buddha taught. While a detailed knowledge of every *sutta* perhaps was out of reach, a knowledge of the essence of Dhamma was a realistic goal.

Does a translation of “abhidhamma, abhivāyaya” as “essence of the teaching and monastic discipline” square with the four remaining occurrences of “abhidhamma” in the Canon? Yes it does. In the Mahāgosiṅgā Sutta, a group of prominent disciples were sitting around one evening in a wooded grove discussing the ideal bhikkhu. Each of these bhikkhus had gained fame for some outstanding virtue they possessed and each in turn described a virtuous bhikkhu in terms of this personally outstanding trait. Moggallāna described the ideal bhikkhu as “one who talks on *abhidhamma*, asking one another questions; in answering one another’s questions they respond and do not fail, and their talk on Dhamma goes forward.”²⁶ Moggallāna had gained a reputation as a talker on Dhamma. Here we find him describing situation where two bhikkhus discuss Dhamma and appear to be in general agreement; “they respond and do not fail.” Such agreement would come only if the fundamental outlook and concepts of what they were discussing were familiar to both. They surely cannot be discussing moot, difficult philosophical points, but basic, essential truths. Thus “essence of the teaching” here would be a good translation of “abhidhamma.”

We read in the Kinti Sutta evidence that further supports this interpretation of “abhidhamma.”²⁷ In this *sutta* the Buddha describes how essential it is for the bhikkhus to be in agreement on matters of “abhidhamma.” From the context it is obvious that “abhidhamma” here refers back to the thirty-seven factors of Enlightenment.²⁸

Wherefore, bhikkhus, those things taught to you by me out of superknowledge, that is to say the four applications of mindfulness, the four right efforts, the four bases of psychic power, the five controlling faculties, the five powers, the seven links in awakening, the Ariyan eightfold path—all together, in harmony and without contention you should train yourselves in each and all of these. But when you, bhikkhus, all together, in harmony and without contention have trained yourselves in these, there might be two bhikkhus speaking differently about *abhidhamma*.²⁹

The thirty-seven factors of Enlightenment form the basic, essential core of Buddhist teaching. Many scholars, in the idealistic search for what the Buddha actually taught (the words of the Buddha), point to these factors as that beyond which we cannot go.³⁰ The Buddha

26. *Middle Length Sayings* (PTS) I, p. 266.

27. *Middle Length Sayings* (PTS), III, p. 24.

28. The commentary on the *Middle Length Sayings* says “abhidhamma” here refers back to the thirty-seven factors of Enlightenment listed in the same paragraph.

29. *Middle Length Sayings* (PTS) III, p. 25.

30. See Edward Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1973), pp. 31-34.

in this *sutta* made it clear that contention and disagreement on this core of his teaching must be avoided. He demanded of his bhikkhus a harmonious outlook on both the denotation and connotation of these basic teachings. While we suspect that institutional harmony constituted a large, if not to say the major, reason for this demand, for our purposes it is most useful to notice that the word "abhidhamma" is used to describe this essential teaching.

Many passages indicate the unique nature of these early Buddhist discussions. In the *Gradual Sayings* a story tells us of a young man named Citta who constantly interrupted a group of elder bhikkhus who were discussing "abhidhamma."³¹ We know from other sources that Citta prided himself on his keenness in distinguishing subtle differences in the meaning of words.³² Most likely his interruptions in this story were attempts to make his keenness felt. Mahā Koṭṭhita rebukes him and asks him not to interrupt. The Elder Koṭṭhita then goes on to give a series of similes describing one who has a contentious spirit (like Citta's) and the fate of such a person (he frequently enters and leaves the Order). From this story we can deduce that these discussions on "abhidhamma" were not so much disputations as recitals of those ideas which they held in common. We have throughout the Dīgha Nikāya discussions between the Buddha and various disciples which can only be described as disputations. But it is interesting that the word "abhidhamma" is not used to describe these discussions. In the passages where "abhidhamma" occurs, harmony, and accord compromise the main point expressed.

Finally, the word "abhidhamma" occurs in a passage in the *Gradual Sayings* which deals with dangers the Buddha sees threatening the purity of the teaching.³³ The five dangers of this section all deal with the corruption of the Dhamma and discipline; bhikkhus who have not paid the price in cultivating *śīla*, *samādhi*, and *paññā* will: 1) by association contaminate other bhikkhus adversely; 2) give poor guidance to younger bhikkhus; 3) teach doctrine while not fully understanding what they teach; 4) pay more attention to teachings not by the Buddha than by the Buddha; 5) become lazy in making spiritual progress. "Abhidhamma" occurs in the third danger: *abhidhammakathaṃ vedallakathaṃ kathenta kaṇhaṃ dhammaṃ akkamamana no bijjhissanti*.³⁴ Here in the PTS edition of the *Gradual Sayings* translates "abhidhamma" as more-dhamma and "vedalla" (one of the literary genres used in the Buddhist scriptures) as runes. He sets them as on equal footing by translating it! "When giving a talk (*kathenta*) on more-dhamma or runes..." A better translation would not set them off by "or" (in the Pali, "va" is not present); Hare's translation leaves the impression that "abhidhamma" is one of the nine "aṅgas" (literary genres), which it is not.³⁵ Instead, *vedalla* should be seen as modifying "abhidhamma"; "When giving a talk on "abhidhamma" which is *vedalla*..." A *vedalla* is a *sutta* in the form of

31. *Gradual Sayings* (PTS), III, p. 280.

32. *Dialogues of the Buddha* (PTS), I, p. 256n.

33. *Gradual Sayings* (PTS), III, p. 85.

34. *Anguttara Nikāya* (PTS), III, p. 107.

35. *Gradual Sayings* (PTS), II, pp. 6-7.

questions, a catechetical discourse. This passage refers to the way in which the "essence of the teaching" (*abhidhamma*) came to be disseminated to the younger bhikkhus; through a prescribed question and answer format. The Buddha here expresses a concern that this passing on will come to be done by those who do not fully understand what they teach or who do so, as the commentary states, "looking for defects, marking, preaching for gain and honour."³⁶

"Essence of the teaching" fits the last four contexts quite well. When taken along with our findings for the "abhidhamma, abhivinaya" phrase, "essence" seems to be an altogether adequate translation. While not a perfect translation (the impossible dream), it does gather together in one term concepts which earlier translations ignore; "essence" implies a condensed, manageable body of material which all bhikkhus could discuss harmoniously, it has no connotations of éliteness, it suggests intensified importance, the general meaning of "abhi-". The Buddha, while careful not to overstress philosophical positions, considered a basic orientation (an asking of the correct questions) indispensable for one to be considered a "Buddhist". He makes allusions to this throughout the *Sutta Piṭaka* and in several places becomes quite specific, e.g. the *Brahmajāla Sutta*. "Abhidhamma", "essence of the teaching" came to be the core of his teaching.

The value of this revised translation lies in the increased understanding it gives us of the body of writing which later came to bear the title *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*. Obviously the result of an attempt to make manageable the extremely large and diverse materials which grew up around the Buddha's teaching in the immediate centuries following his death, the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* reflects the scholastic nature of its origin, the teaching in teachable form. Because of its complexity it outgrew this early role and became the pinnacle of Theravāda Buddhist philosophy but in it can easily be recognised the early quintessence which bhikkhus passed on to one another, and to pupils and novices.

36. *Gradual Sayings* (PTS), III, p. 85n.

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STUDIES IN THE JINACARITA*

Sukomal Chaudhuri**

The Jinacarita¹ is a poem on the life of the Buddha. It was written by the Thera Vanaratana Medhamkara² of the Vijayabāhu-pariveṇa of Ceylon during the reign of King Bhuvaneka-bāhu I (1277-88 A.C.). Like the Mahāvamsa, Dīpavamsa and Dāṭhāvamsa, it is an important contribution to the history of Pali literature. According to B.C. Law 'it represents a poetic development in Pali similar to that represented by the Buddha-carita in Sanskrit Buddhist literature,³. As a good specimen of fine poetry, it comes in the category of a *Khaṇḍakāvya* (short poem) like the Meghadūta and Rtusamhāra of Kalidāsa in Sanskrit. Though not of as high a poetic merit as the Meghadūta, the crest-jewel of *Khaṇḍakāvya*, yet, as B. M. Barua⁴ says, the Jinacarita is undoubtedly, the best work of its kind in Pali.' The following words of W. Stede in his "note on the position of the Dāṭhāvamsa in the history of Pali Literature"⁵ are applicable to the Jinacarita also: 'There are not many books of that character in the Canon or post-canonical literature, and it is a pleasant change to see the venerable language of the Nikāyas put to a different, i.e. fluently poetical, use. It testifies also to the importance of this language and the favour it has found upto modern times. The character of Classical Pali is well retained, although the Sanskrit education of its author has left its stamp on its style.' According to Charles Duroiselle, the poet of the Jinacarita 'has risen to heights placing him in the foremost rank among poets only in those places where he has broken through the slavish imitation, and written from the depths of his own inspiration.' But Winternitz⁶ has to some extent underestimated the merit of the book with the statement that 'it is a very mediocre poem on the life of the Buddha, in simple and natural, but not particularly beautiful language. It looks almost like a somewhat clumsy versification of the Nidāna-kathā'. We however agree with the statement that the Jinacarita is a mediocre poem on the life of the Buddha, for as regards merit it cannot be compared with Aśvaghōsa's Buddhacarita, an actual epic of the Buddha. But what is remarkable is that like Aśvaghōsa the poet of the Jinacarita has not burdened his poem with unnecessary doctrinal matters, his chief intention being simply to write a biography of the Buddha. It is not a clumsy versification of the Nidāna-Kathā, as Winternitz has pointed out, but it is something more than that. It is not unlikely that the author of the Jinacarita has utilised the Nidāna-Kathā as the source of his book. But like a swan he has shunned aside the water and has sucked up only

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1. Edited and translated by W. H. D. Rouse (JPTS, 1904-5 p. 1 ff.) and by Charles Duroiselle, Rangoon 1906. Here I have utilised the Rouse edition of the Pali Text Society.

2. JPTS. 1890, p. 63. JPTS, 1886, p. 62, 72.

3. *A History of Pali Literature* II. pp. 614 foll.4. *Ceylon Lectures*, p. 101.5. *Dāṭhāvamsa* (Lahore edition, 1925) p. iii.6. *A History of Indian Literature* II, p. 224.

poetic sentiment. His description of the journey to Kapilavatthu from Rāṅgaha (vv. 347-352) is beautiful and unique for which our poet should occupy a place in the foremost rank of poets. His description of the beauty and charms of Māyā (vv. 77-78) and Yasodharā (vv. 172 and 395) is delicate and graceful. His description of the overall change in the world immediately after the birth of Siddhattha (vv. 98-116), and his description of Siddhattha's conflict with Māra under the Bodhi-tree (vv. 243-265)—all are striking, and exemplify the poet's real poetic intellect.

But what is remarkable about the style of the Jinacarita is that in most cases it is concise and light while at the same time elegant and brilliant. The verses no doubt are constructed artificially but we seldom find any difficult or irregular constructions¹⁷. Besides, the verses are embellished with choicest words and striking figures of speech. How excellent and appropriate appears that simile in which Sumedha is compared to a royal elephant as an elephant flees from a forest blazing with fire, Sumedha also departed from his house (blazing with passions, envy, delusion and the like—v. 21); or in which the newborn child Siddhattha is compared to a golden goose—Siddhattha came forth from the womb of his mother like a golden goose descending from a lotus (v. 88); or in which consorting of deer (or animals) with lions is compared to that of parents with children (v. 100); or in which Yasodharā is compared to a moon which is aspired to by all bee-like eyes (v. 172); or in which the Buddha's journey is compared to that of the moon—like a pure full moon surrounded by stars, the Buddha went here and there being accompanied by his brilliant disciples (vv. 326, 356-357).

In conclusion, we quote Charles Duroiselle's comment: 'The charm of the Jinacarita lies in its lighter style; in the author's choice of graceful and sometimes forcible images; in the art of his descriptions, the richness and, in some passages, the delicacy of his expressions; qualities which go to make its reading of heavy didactic poetry'.¹⁸ But for its some lengthy and bombastic compounded words and some prosy expressions, the Jinacarita could have occupied a place in the foremost rank of the Indian *kāvya*s.

THE LOTUS AS A SYMBOL IN THE PALI TRADITION

Carl Olson*

From Hindus mythology, one learns that from the golden lotus on Viṣṇu's forehead appeared the goddess Śrī. In another episode, while reclining on the serpent Ananta a lotus stalk arose from Viṣṇu's navel which gave birth to the god Brahma. In sculpture Viṣṇu is often depicted holding a lotus-flower in one of his four hands. In post-Vedic literature Surya, the sun god, is represented as standing on a red lotus flower. Besides its importance in Hindu religion, the lotus-flower plays a prominent role in Mahāyāna Buddhist literature and art; it is especially associated with the Bodhisattva.¹ The purpose of this paper is to examine the symbol of the lotus in the earlier Pāli Buddhist tradition. It will be demonstrated that much of the later symbolic significance of the lotus in Mahāyāna Buddhism is prefigured in the Pāli tradition.

The lotus is not just any lovely product of nature; it possesses a mysterious power. If used in conjunction with medicines, the lotus can cure illness.² It is reported that it helped cure the fever of Śāriputta, an important early disciple of the Buddha.³ Thus from an early period in the Buddhist tradition the lotus had a magical quality.

The lotus is a plant which grows upward from the bottom of a lake or pond and slowly ascends to the surface. Thus the lotus is born in the water, it comes to full maturity in the water, eventually rises to the surface and stands unspotted by the water. As such, it serves as a symbol of the Tathāgata (the one thus come), who is born and matures in the world, passes beyond the world, and eventually emerges untainted by the world.⁴ In this sense, the lotus is not only a symbol of the Tathāgata but also of upward action, spiritual growth and attainment, and detachment from the world.

The spiritual development of human beings is represented by the lotus. There are beings with a little or much dust in their eyes. Others possess acute or dull faculties. In other words, some individuals are more benighted than others. Just as some lotus-flowers thrive while immersed in water, others reach the surface of the water, and some rise undefiled out of the water.⁵

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1. See Heinrich Zimmer, *The Art of Indian Asia Its Mythology and Transformations* 2 Vols., ed. Joseph Campbell (New York: Random House Inc., 1960), I: 181ff; see also William E. Ward, 'The Lotus Symbol: Its Meaning in Buddhist Art and Philosophy', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. II (1952-53), pp. 135-146.

2. *The Book of the Discipline* (Vinaya Piṭaka) Vol. IV (Mahāvagga) trans. I. B. Horner (London: Luzac & Company Ltd., 1962), 278.

3. *Ibid.*, 214.

4. *The Book of the Kindred Sayings* (Samyutta Nikāya) Vol. III, trans. F. L. Woodward (London: Luzac & Company Ltd., 1954), 3, 139.

5. *The Middle Length Sayings* (Majjhima Nikāya) 3 Vols. trans. I. B. Horner (London: Luzac & Company Ltd., 1967), I. 169; *Dialogues of the Buddha* (Digha Nikāya) 3 Vols., T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids (London Luzac & Company Ltd., 1966-1971), II. 38-39.

17. Very few contracted forms like *pāpetva* (v. 326) has been used for the sake of metre.

18. Jinacarita (ed. and translated by Charles Duroiselle), Introduction, p. ii,

At times, the lotus beneath the water is symbolic of a bhikkhu in the third state of trance. Just as the lotus flourishes beneath the water and is saturated by cool water, a monk in the third trance state is saturated with joy.⁶ The bhikkhu in this state is serene and self-possessed.

In the Sangīti Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya,⁷ four types of recluses are enumerated: the unshaken recluse; the blue lotus recluse; the white lotus recluse; and the exquisite recluse. I want to concentrate on the significance of the blue and white lotus recluses.

The blue lotus recluse is equivalent to a once-returned (*sakadāgāmin*):

Herein a monk, by utterly wearing out three fetters and by weakening lust, anger and delusion, is a once-returned. Coming back just once more to this world he makes an end of Ill.⁸

The blue lotus recluse is assured of no bad rebirths and enlightenment within one more lifetime. He is free of the three fetters (*saṃyojana*): delusions of self; doubts about the Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha; trust in the efficacy of rituals and good works.⁹ If one places the colour blue within the Indian cultural context, one discovers that since indigo-blue is so durable, blue is the colour of faithfulness.¹⁰ Furthermore, the blue lotus recluse contemplates the rise and fall of the five-grasping groups (*upādānakkhandhā*), but he does not experience the eight deliverances (*vimokhas*).¹¹

The white lotus recluse is equal to the degree of sanctification represented by a non-returned (*anāgāmin*):

Herein a monk, by utterly wearing out the five fetters which cause rebirth here, is apparitionally born, destined there to pass utterly away, of a nature not to return from that world.¹²

The non-returned destroys the initial three fetters plus sensuality and ill-will.¹³ The white lotus recluse is assured of enlightenment during his current lifetime. He will be reborn in another world and never return to the present cycle of suffering.¹⁴ Like the blue lotus recluse, he contemplates the rise and fall of the five-grasping groups, but he goes beyond the level of spiritual attainment of the blue lotus recluse by personally experiencing the eight deliverances.¹⁵

In many world religions, white is the colour of purity. The lotus is rooted and grows in the slimy mud at the bottom of a pond. As it

6. *Middle Length Sayings*, I. 277; 2. 16; 3. 93.

7. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, III. 233.

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9. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, I. 156.

10. Friedrich Heiler, *Erscheinungsformen und Wesen der Religion* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1961), p. 125.

11. *The Book of the Gradual Sayings*, 2. 90.

12. *Ibid.*, 2.88; 2.89.

13. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, I. 156.

14. *Ibid.*, III. 132.

15. *The Book of the Gradual Sayings*, 2.90; 2.89.

moves upward and blossoms forth, the white lotus is untainted by the mud of the earth. Likewise, the successful monk emerges clean and purified of the world's uncleanness.

The lotus is a symbol of spiritual progress and enlightenment. It grows in the maternal, primeval, procreative waters. The waters represent the pre-formal potentiality for spiritual enlightenment. It is the unformed from which a new form, new being or new life can emerge. Within the water, the lotus represents its generative organ; it is the energy and force inherent in the waters.¹⁶ The waters—the symbol of life-gives new life; the lotus is nourished by the waters, but it eventually rises above the waters and symbolically transcends them. Not a drop of water can cling to the leaves of the lotus which becomes totally detached like the enlightened saint. The gradual rising of the lotus is an act of creation; the emerging of a new being.

The significance of the lotus as a pre-eminent symbol in Mahāyāna Buddhism is prefigured in the Pali tradition. In other words, the seeds of its later importance are rooted in the Pali tradition and in early Hinduism. For example, a symbol of the ātman is the lotus of the heart.¹⁷ For one who knows the truth, evil action does not adhere to him, just as water does not cling to the leaf of a lotus-flower.¹⁸ And from its association with the Hindu goddesses, the lotus connotes the supra-mundane character of the enlightened ones of the Mahāyāna tradition.¹⁹ The unfolding of the lotus is symbolic of the dawn of enlightenment and the victory over ignorance. It represents the wisdom of Nibbāna, the aspiring monk, and the various levels of human existence.

16. Heinrich Zimmer, *Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization*, ed. Joseph Campbell (New York: Pantheon Books, 1963), p. 90.

17. *Maitri Upaniṣad*, 6.2; *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 8.1.1.

18. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 4.14.3.

19. Zimmer, *The Art of Indian Asia*, p. 175.

THE WAY TO NIRVANA ACCORDING TO THE DHAMMAPADA

L. M. Joshi**

1. The Dhammapada

The Dhammapada is a collection of 423 verses in classical Pali. It forms the second book of the Minor Collection (Khuddakanikāya) of the Sutta Piṭaka of the Theravāda Buddhist tradition. More than half of the verses collected in this book have been traced to the other Pali texts of the Tipiṭaka. This shows that it was compiled by some able Buddhist sage after the first four Nikāyas had received their present form. The fact that the Dhammapada is an anthology of sayings attributed to the Buddha compiled perhaps at the time of the final reduction of the Pali Tipitaka, suggests a definite purpose of this compilation. In our opinion this purpose was to present a practical manual or guide to those who seek to realize Nirvāṇa. Similar Buddhist anthologies are found in Sanskrit and Prakrit languages also. The Udānavarga and the Gandhārī Dharmapada are two well-known examples of this class of texts. The Pali Dhammapada belongs to the Sthaviravāda School, the Udānavarga belongs to the Sarvāstivāda School, while the Gandhārī Dharmapada perhaps belongs to the Dharmaguptaka School of ancient Buddhism. The fact that there are many verses common to these three anthologies indicates their common source belonging to a period prior to the rise of schools in the Buddhist Tradition.

As an authentic guide to the seekers of Nirvāṇa, the Dhammapada seems to present us with a complete perspective of the Way to Nirvāṇa. The purpose of the present paper is to describe this Way. In a recent paper I have suggested that the word Dharma, means Nirvāṇa also, and that the word *pada* means the way; in other words, the title *dhammapada* has been interpreted in the sense of 'the Way to Nirvāṇa'. Here we propose to analyse different facets of the Way according to the Pali Dhammapada.

2. Futility of External Asceticism

It is sometimes said that the Buddhist Way to Nirvāṇa is ascetic, and that Nirvāṇa can be achieved only by the ascetic monk. This view seems to be based on a misunderstanding of the Way. It has to be remembered that Sakyamuni had rejected the path of mortifying asceticism as fruitless. He had finally adopted the Middle Way which led him to Buddhahood. This Middle Way transcends both mortifying physical austerities and thoughtless indulgence in sense-pleasures.

There is, nevertheless, a certain degree of ascetic discipline in the total structure of the Way. This ascetic or yogic strand of the Way does

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not consist in external forms of asceticism; it consists in a systematic method of restraining the bodily, mental, and vocal actions with a view to effecting total external and internal purification and in developing inner awakening. This can be achieved by the monks who have renounced the common mode of existence as well as by the lay people who are living in society as regular members of the Buddha's Universal Order. We shall quote a few verses from our text to support the above view.

Rejecting mere external asceticism, the Buddha declares that "Not wandering naked, nor matted locks, nor filth, nor fasting, nor lying on the ground, nor dust, nor ashes, nor striving squatting on the heels, can purify a mortal who has not overcome doubts" (verse 141). One does not become a true monk merely by wearing an ochre-robe. Defining a true monk, the Lord says: "He who, though richly decked, behaves impartially, is peaceful, subdued, settled (on the Way), of holy conduct, and has ceased to harm all living beings, is indeed a holy man, a samana, a bhikkhu" (verse 142).

A mere yellow robe is not enough; ascetic discipline does not consist in external rituals and symbols of austerity. In one of the sterner sayings in our text we read the following: "What is the use of your matted hair, O fool? What is the use of your garment of antelope skin? Inside you are full of passions, but the outside you make clean" (verse 394). Corrupt monks were not unknown in ancient times. It is stated that "Many men whose shoulders are covered with the yellow robe are of evil character and unrestrained; such evil-doers by their evil deeds go to hell" (verse 307).

3. Necessity of Self-Effort

Another feature characteristic of the Way to Nirvāṇa is the necessity of individual effort. Here is the message of self-reliance and independence broadcast by one who had attained Nirvāṇa by his own efforts. In many verses of our text individual effort on the part of the seeker is declared essential. "What neither mother, nor father, nor any other relative can do, a well-directed mind does and thereby elevates one" (verse 43). In the two opening verses of the text the mind is declared to be the forerunner of all our good and evil states and supremacy of what we think is emphasised (verse 1-2). A wise man is he who purifies himself of the impurities of the mind (verse 88). Purification does not come from without; it comes from within and is achieved by oneself. Therefore, the Buddha says: "Oneself, indeed, is one's master; what other master could there be? With oneself well subdued, one finds a master difficult to find" (verse 160).

No god nor any other higher power is recognized in the Buddhist doctrine. Man is himself fully responsible for his condition in the course of existence, and he is also fully capable of effecting his liberation from this course. The teacher of this principle of independence and self-reliance has exhorted his disciples in the following words: "Rouse yourself by yourself, examine yourself by yourself; thus self-guarded and mindful, O brother, you will live happily. Self, indeed, is the master of

self. Self is the refuge of self. Therefore, subdue yourself as the merchant subdues a good horse" (verses:379-380).

As is well known, these sayings of the Buddha seem to have inspired some ideas contained in the Bhagavadgīta. Consider, for instance, the following three verses in this text: "One should elevate oneself by oneself, and should not debase oneself; for self is the only friend of self, and self is the only enemy of self. To him who has subdued his self by his self, his self is friend; but to him who has not subdued his self, his own self will behave inimically, like an enemy. He who is self-subdued and pacified, his supreme self remains concentrated in cold and heat, pleasure and pain, likewise in honour and disgrace" (VI. 5-7). Some modern translators, who were struck by these two sets of verses with almost parallel contents, have misinterpreted the meaning of these verses of the Dhammapada. In the Bhagavadgīta the first line of the seventh verse of the sixth chapter reads thus: *jitātmanah prasāntasya paramātma samāhitah*, which we have rendered as "he who is self subdued and pacified, his supreme self (*paramātma*) remains concentrated". Those who are wedded to the doctrine of "God" or "Supreme Self" (*param-ātma*) make here a distinction between a lower *ātma* and a higher *ātma*, and think that the self-subdued man becomes established in the Supreme Self or God (*paramātma samāhitah*). This may be a possible interpretation in some form of theistic Vedānta in which an embodied self (*jīvātma*) is destined to merge into the Supreme Self (*paramātma*). The Bhagavadgīta itself teaches this belief in several of its verses. But this idea is not found in the verses quoted above. The Self-subdued man remains stilled (*samāhita*) and concentrated even when he encounters pairs of opposites because of his self mastery and self-conquest (*jitātma*). His subdued self itself is called *paramātma* or supreme self; in other words, *jitātma*, *prasāntātma* and *paramātma* are epithets of the same yogin who remains in absorption and is not disturbed by heat, cold, praise and insult.

When even on the evidence of the Bhagavadgīta, VI. 5-7, we cannot find the theory of conquering lower self by another higher self, how can we find such a theory in the Dhammapada which is an authentic document of a non-Vedic and non-theistic tradition which has held aloft the unique banner of *anātmavāda* or the principle of not-self? Those who try to offer a Vedāntic interpretation of Buddhist principles and practices seem to be engaged in what is called *vipallāsa* or *viparyāsa*.

When the Buddha says that self is the refuge of self, it simply means that oneself is the refuge of oneself, there is no other refuge. The duality between a lower and a higher self is foreign to Buddhist thought. This duality is opposed to the Buddhist principle of autonomy which stresses self-exertion, self-reliance, and ultimately self-transcendence. In Nirvāna there is neither *ātma* nor *paramātma*. The Buddhist soteriology differs radically from all the other theistic soteriologies which teach surrender to God and make salvation dependent on His grace. The Buddhist Way to Ultimate Release keeps man at the centre of the whole drama of *saṃsāra* and seeks to release him not only from suffering but also from God, gods, and all kinds of foreign powers and fears. He who wants

to be released ultimately must work for it diligently and with earnestness. The text says: "by oneself, indeed, is evil done; by oneself is one defiled. By oneself is evil avoided; by oneself, indeed, is one purified. Purity and impurity depend on oneself. No one can purify another" (verse 165).

This doctrine might appear disappointing and even terrifying to the weeklings, devoid of firm mind and sharp intellect. The strength to follow the Buddha's Way comes from the capacity to renounce all that does not conduce to the realisation of Nirvāna. Those whose strength lies in their self-love and who cherish ownership in any of its forms cannot renounce; they are indeed frightened and therefore seek some external assistance and refuge. "Driven by fear, people go to many a refuge, to hills, woods, groves, trees, and shrines. But that is not safe refuge, that is not the best refuge. One is not delivered from all sufferings by resorting to such refuge" (verses 188-189). People do not know that the ultimate Protection or Security from suffering and death can be achieved only by successfully traversing the Way to Nirvāna. The text says: "Sons are no protection, nor father, nor brothers, for one who is seized by death kinsmen are of no protection. Knowing this fact, let a wise and good person immediately clear the Way to Nirvāna" (verses 288-289). The Goal, the Teacher, and the Way are there; the disciple has to make the effort by himself to reach the Goal by following the Way pointed out by the Teacher. The Buddha says: "If you go on this Way you will make an end of suffering. I have taught the Way having known the removed of the arrow of suffering. You yourself must make an effort. The Transcendent Ones (Tathāgates) are only teachers. The meditative ones; who enter the Way, are released from the bonds of Death" (verses 275-276).

4. Ethical Practices

The text occasionally refers to the Eightfold Way (verses 191 and 273); the Eight Factors of the Way find mention here and there, and all of these factors are part of Buddhist ethical practices. The Eightfold Way constitutes the fourth Holy Truth, and it is believed to include the triple course of training, viz. ethical, Mental, and intellectual (*sīla*, *samādhi* *prajñā*). Right Speech, Right Action, and Right Livelihood, these three factors of the Eightfold Way constitute ethical training; Right Effort, Right Mindfulness, and Right Concentration constitute the Mental training, while Right Perspective and Right Aim constitute the intellectual training culminating in Wisdom. A detailed description of these Eight Factors is not needed here, because this is given in almost all modern books on Buddhism.

The Dhammapada (verse 89) once refers to the Factors of Enlightenment (*sambodhyaṅgas*). Like the Eight Factors of the Holy Way, the Seven Factors of Enlightenment are included in a most ancient list of Srāmanic practices known as Thirty-seven principles Conducive to Enlightenment (*bodhipākṣika-dharmas*). The seven Factors of Enlightenment are: Mindfulness (*smṛti*), Energy (*vīrya*), Joy (*prīti*), Serenity (*prasrabdhi*), Concentration (*samādhi*), and Impartiality (*upekṣa*). It

needs no mention that several factors are common to these two lists of eight and seven factors. In many verses of our text almost all the Seven Factors of Enlightenment find a pointed reference. The scheme of triple course of training noted above is again elaborated to some extent in the practice of the Seven Factors.

One of the most important terms which is also one of the key-concepts of Buddhism is *śīla*. It covers the entire range of ethical conduct and religious behaviour developed by the Buddhist tradition. The Dhammapada repeatedly refers to numerous facets of moral and religious culture summed up by the term *śīla*.

It is acknowledged that the vast majority of people in the world are undisciplined; hence the seeker of Nirvāṇa will have to endure abuse patiently (verse 320). Control of the mind and the sense organs is the key to successful observance of ethical principles. In all the eleven verses the second chapter of our text teaches the necessity of controlling the mind (verses 33-34). It is indeed said that those who subdue their mind are free from the bonds of Māra (verse 37). Love is a virtue which must be cultivated, for it is the only antidote to hatred (verse 5). Heedfulness, temperance, virtuous conduct and truth are praised in many verses of the first and second chapters (verses 9, 10, 16, 18, 21, 22, 31, 32). Pure deeds, actions, with consideration, restraint, and living in conformity with the teaching are recommended (verse 24, 86). He who has subdued his senses, is free from pride, and has eradicated evil propensities is considered superior to the gods (verse 94). One must reflect peace through one's mind, speech and activities (verse 96).

A few verses of our text sum up the negative and positive contents of *śīla*. "Not to do any evil deeds, to accomplish good deeds, and to purify one's own mind—this is the teaching of the Buddhas" (verse 183). Forbearing patience is declared to be the supreme form of austerity (verse 184). Another verse mentions the following principles of ethical conduct: "Not to slander, not to harm, to observe the liberating code of conduct, to eat moderately, to sleep and sit in seclusion, and to cultivate higher thoughts—this is the teaching of the Buddhas" (verse 185).

Among all the perfumes the perfume of virtue is supreme; the perfume of fragrance of virtuous people is supreme; it blows even amongst the gods; those who are endowed with virtuous conduct are beyond the reach of Māra (verses 55-57). Keeping the company of intelligent and wise men who detect and point out faults is part of ethical training (verse 76). The text counsels thus: "Do not have evil-doers for friends; do not have mean people for friends. Have virtuous people for friends; have the best of men for friends" (verse 76). "The wise people control themselves; they are not ruffled by praise and blame; having heard the teachings, the wise people become serene like a deep, still, and clear Lake" (verses 80-82). The word *śānta*, in the sense of good, quiescent and wise sage, occurs perhaps for the first time in the Pali texts. It became popular and theologically significant in the medieval Indian texts of religious poetry. But in the ascetic and non-theistic Buddhist tradition a *śānta* is identical with an *arhat*; he is also called *satpuruṣa*, good

person, and *paṇḍita*, wise. An *arhat* or a *śānta* is a kind of sage who has achieved liberation in this very life. He is not influenced by the world and its ills, although he lives in the world wearing his last body. The *śānta* or sages are described thus: "The good persons renounce everything everywhere; the sages do not prattle longing for sensepleasure. Whether touched by happiness or suffering, the wise people are neither elated nor depressed" (verse 83). All their actions of mind, speech, and body are characterised by peace" (verse 96).

The observance of ethical precepts is accompanied by peace and happiness. More than one dozen verses of our text are in praise of happiness (197-208). Freedom from hatred, ailments, greed, possessions, lust and desire brings happiness. Hatred is described as the greatest evil, and peace is described as the supreme form of happiness. The real strength consists of the strength to forbear patiently (verse 399).

Good health or freedom from disease is as much part of Buddhist ethical life as contentment and confidence (verse 204). "Seeing and living with holy, persons is constantly blessed; if a man did not see fools, he would be constantly happy" (verse 206). Several verses teach the avoidance of affection, attachment lust and craving for obtaining freedom from suffering and fear (verses 213-216). The practice of virtue not only secures freedom from suffering and fear but also ensures affability. He who is endowed with moral virtue and insight, who is established in righteousness, knows the truth, and does what is his own duty, him the people hold dear" (verse 217). "He who finds faults with others and is irritable increases his own impurities" (verse 253).

More than a dozen verses are devoted to a discussion of the evils of anger (verse 221-234). Anger and pride are the two chief enemies of the holy life. In a most remarkable verse the Buddha admonishes thus: "Conquer anger by love; conquer evil by good; conquer the stingy by liberality; conquer the liar by truth" (verse 223). In another verse, speaking the truth, not getting angry, and giving even from a scanty store to one who begs, these three steps are said to lead one to the presence of the gods (verse 224). Those who are controlled in their bodies and are inoffensive, such sages achieve the Indestructible position where they grieve not (verse 225). Control of body, speech, and mind is the mark of those steadfast people who are well controlled.

The celebrated five ethical precepts (*pañcaśīla*) are highlighted in some verses. "He who destroys life, tells lies, takes in this world what is not given to him, goes to another man's wife, and who is addicted to intoxicating liquors, such a one digs his own roots in this world" (verses 246-247). Comparing oneself with others, one should neither strike nor cause to strike (verse 129). Envy, lust, hate, folly and greed are stated to be some of the greatest evils (verses 248-251). A wise and righteous person is one who discriminates between right and wrong, who leads others lawfully and impartially and who is the guardian of the law (verses 256-257). Forgiveness, friendliness, and fearlessness are the characteristics of a wise man (verse 258). A holy or noble man is he who is inoffensive towards all living beings (verse 270). The principle of *ahiṃsā*

is thus made the basis of the holy life. At another place passionlessness is declared to be the best among the virtues (verses 273). Idleness, slothfulness and weakness of will are the obstructions on the Way (verse 280). These should be removed. The Buddha asks us to uproot our self-love, then only can we cherish the road of peace (verse 285). He who conquers himself is certainly a superman (verse 322). "The dull-witted man, when he is lazy gluttonous, sleepy, and rolls about lying like a large hog nourished on pig-wash, obtains repeated births" (verse 325).

The virtue of faith is eulogised in some verse (38, 144, 303 and 333). It performs a necessary preliminary function. It is better to live alone rather than associate with a fool; with few wishes and without committing sins, let a man walk on alone (verse 330). The need of eradicating craving is stressed in some verses (334-337). False speech is a sure road to hell (verse 306); so is the courting of another's wife (verses 309-310). Desire for wealth, wife and sons is a bond stronger than those made of iron, wood or hemp (verse 345). Gifts bestowed on those who are free from lust, hate, delusion and craving bring great reward (verses 356-359). The gift of the Doctrine is said to excel all gifts (verse 354).

Destruction of impurities (*āśrayas*) is one of the major aims of ethical practice. The word restraint (*saṃvara*) sums up a large part of Buddhist ethics. Restraint in thought, speech, body and in all parts of the body and in all things is indeed said to be the way to freedom from suffering (verses 360-363). While restraint is a negative measure, friendliness (*maitrī*) is a positive virtue which should govern man's behaviour with other living beings. "He who abides in friendliness and is pleased in the Buddha's teaching, attains the blissful state of quiescence of the conditioned phenomena" (verse 368). To achieve perfection in good conduct and to radiate happiness everywhere are also means of ending misery (verse 376). Sense-control, contentment, association, with good friends (*kalyāṇamitra*) who are energetic and of pure livelihood, and observing restraint according to the liberating code of conduct (*prātimokṣa*), these are the basic preliminaries of ethical practice.

5. Meditational Practices

Buddhist religious culture has stressed control and purification of the mind to an extraordinary degree. Mind is declared to be the forerunner and governor of all our good and evil states leading to happiness and suffering (verses 1-2). A well-developed mind cannot be penetrated by passion (verse 14). He whose mind is well released is able to destroy attachment, hatred, and delusion (verse 20). In order to attain release of the mind one must study, regulate and cleanse it thoroughly. This depends upon constant watchfulness (*apramāda*) which is declared to be the way to deathlessness. "The wise people who are steadfast and ever meditative, possessed of strong powers, realise the supreme security that is Nirvāṇa" (verse 23). Earnest meditation leads to abundant bliss (verse 27). So does a controlled and guarded mind (verse 35-36). Those who subdue the mind, which travels far, wanders alone, is bodiless, and hides in the cave (of consciousness), are liberated from the bonds of Māra (verse 37). A wise man, therefore, purifies himself

of all impurities of the mind (verse 88). "Those whose minds are well cultivated in the Factors of Enlightenment, who rejoice in renunciation of clinging and grasping, whose impurities have been destroyed, and who are luminous, they are released even in this world" (verse 89). A released sage is called *śanta* and *upaśanta*, quiet and quiescent. Unrest is a mark of bondage.

Even the deities love the Rightly Enlightened ones who are mindful, wise, intent on meditation, and who delight in renunciation and quiescence (verse 181). Meditation (*yoga*) produces wisdom (*bhūri*); in the absence of meditation, wisdom is lost (verse 282). Silence is good when it is accompanied by wisdom and virtue (verses 268-269). Mindfulness of the body coupled with constant reflection leads to the end of evils (verse 293). Constant contemplation on the Buddha, the Dharma, the Sangha, and the body, and constant delight in inoffensiveness and meditation are the regular practices of awakened and watchful disciples of the Buddha (verses 296-301).

Meditation (*dhyāna*) and wisdom (*prajñā*) are complementary. "He who has no wisdom lacks meditation, and he who has no meditation lacks wisdom. He who has both meditation and wisdom, he is indeed in the presence of Nirvāṇa" (verse 372). The process of ultimate release through meditation and insight is summed up in the following words: "The monk who retires to an empty abode, whose mind is quiescent and who perceives the doctrine rightly, experiences a joy transcending that of men. Whenever he reflects on the origination and cessation of compounded heaps, he attains the serene joy and happiness of those who know the Deathless" (verses 373-374). The importance of mindfulness and meditational practices in the Way to Nirvāṇa can scarcely be over-emphasised. The practice of meditation culminates in wisdom.

6. Knowledge and Wisdom

The word *buddha* means the wise, knower awakened or enlightened. Sakyamuni achieved Nirvāṇa and came to be known as Buddha because of His perfection in knowledge and wisdom. The Way to Nirvāṇa may also be described as the Way to Wisdom (*bodhi*). Our text highlights the crucial role of knowledge and wisdom in the process of Enlightenment.

Spiritual ignorance (*avidya*) is stated to be the greatest taint; the Buddha asks us to abandon this taint and become taintless (verse 243). Delusion or folly (*moha*) is stated to be an incomparable snare (verse 251). It can be cut off only by the sword of wisdom. Right knowledge is essential for sharing the fruits of the holy life (verse 20). Discarding heedlessness by heedfulness, a wise and sorrowless man ascends the high palace of wisdom and surveys the sorrowing people (verse 28). "He whose mind is unsteady, who does not know the true doctrine, and whose faith (*prasāda*) wavers, his wisdom will not be perfect" (verse 38). Knowledge of the true doctrine and firm faith are thus necessary for the perfection of wisdom. A disciple of the Rightly Enlightened One outshines the blind worldling in wisdom (verse 59). One must know that the way to Nirvāṇa is different from the way to gain and praise (verse 75). Those

who are released through truly knowing are often referred to (verse 96). Generally speaking, this world is blind and dark; those that can see are very few (verse 174).

The great mass of suffering can be destroyed, among other things, by investigating into the truth (*dharmavinīscaya*) and by obtaining knowledge (verse 144). He who having gone for refuge to the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha, perceives with right knowledge the Four Holy Truths—Suffering, the Origin of Suffering, the End of Suffering, and the Noble Eightfold Way leading to the End of Suffering, is release from all suffering (verses 190-192). “Here I shall live in the rainy season, here in the autumn and in the summer: thus the fool thinks, and does not know the dangers of life and death” (verse 286).

It is one of the well-known Buddhist doctrines that false views (*mīthyā-drṣṭi*) lead to suffering and spiritual decline (verses 316-318). Ultimate Release cannot be achieved without destroying the four fundamental evils—sensuality (*kāma*), lust for life (*bhava*), speculative views (*drṣṭi*) and spiritual ignorance (*avidyā*). These evils called *āśravas* have been translated as impurities, corruptions, cankers, outflows, deadly drugs, and defilements. The Dhammapada repeatedly dwells on the necessity of their extinction (verses 93, 94, 126, 253, 293, 386, 415, 420). All the four *āśravas* can be extinguished by true knowledge and wisdom. Knowledge of the destruction of the *āśravas* is a peculiarity of Buddhas and Arhats. Ethical practices, meditational methods and the cultivation of wisdom have only one aim, namely, the complete destruction of the *āśravas* and attainment of Nirvāṇa.

Knowledge of the three characteristics which characterise the whole mass of conditional things is the declared road to Purification (*visuddhi*). These three characteristics are: “all conditioned things are impermanent” “all conditioned things are involved in suffering”, and “all phenomena are not-self”. He who, with wisdom, discerns this, becomes disgusted with suffering, and goes along the Way to Nirvāṇa (verses 277-279). He who knows the Four Holy Truths, who extinguishes the four *āśravas* by following the Eightfold Way, becomes master of everything and knower of everything. He is the Omniscient One, the Transcendent One, the Released One. The Way terminates in Nirvāṇa.

We have briefly analysed above the practical steps on the Way to Nirvāṇa as found in the Pāli Dhammapada. But the real understanding of the Way consists in actually traversing it and in reaching the end of the journeying. Nothing less than this is enough. The Buddha has given the following warning: “Not merely by morality and austerities, nor again by much learning, nor by entering into meditation, nor yet by sleeping in an empty place do I realise the bliss of renunciation not known to the worldling, O brother do not be confident so long as you have not achieved the destruction of the *āśravas*” (verses 271-272).

PALI BUDDHIST STUDIES IN THE WEST

Russell Webb

10. Poland

The only academic personality who devoted himself solely to Pali studies was Stanislaw Franciszek Michalski-Iwiński. Born 1881 in Tarnograd, he was a Reader at Lodz University and between 1930-39 edited the *Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna I* (Ultima Thule, Warsaw). He translated the Dhammapada in 1925 (Publications de la Societe Asiatique, Ultima Thule) which included a long commentary and an exposition of Buddhism for the West. A second edition appeared under the title, *Scieżka Prawdy* (“The Path of Truth”) in the series “Biblioteka Humanisty” (Lodz 1948). He translated T. W. Rhys Davids’ *Buddhism* (Warsaw-Cracow 1912), the Sutta-Nipāta for the “Oriental Institute’s” journal, *Przegląd Orientalistyczny* (Warsaw 1957-8) and left, in his post-humous papers, an incomplete grammar (*Gramatyka Języka Palijskiego*—duplicate in 1963). He died in Lodz in 1961.

A senior contemporary of Michalski also included Pali within her specialised field. Helena Willman-Grabowska was born 1870 in Warsaw and studied in Berne, Lausanne, London and Paris. She lectured in Pali and Sanskrit at the Sorbonne between 1920-27 and thereafter occupied the Chair of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology at Cracow University where she lectured in Pali and Prakrit. Apart from contributing one section to *L’Inde antique et la civilisation indienne* (Paris 1933), she wrote a number of papers, amongst them “Le genitif en pāli”, “About the Great Renunciation” (1934), “A Motif of Odyssey in a Jātaka” and “Les composes dans les inscriptions d’ Asoka”. She died in Cracow in 1957.

A Professor of Sinology at Warsaw University between the World Wars, Jan Jaworski, contributed two studies to the leading journal of classical Asian themes, *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*: “La Section des Remedies dans le Vinaya des Mahisāsaka et dans le Vinaya pāli” (1928) and “La Section de la Nourriture dans le Vinaya des Mahisāsaka” (1931)—both extracted from the Skandhaka section of the Canon.

Maryla Falk worked with the great Sanskrit scholar Stanislaw Schayer, in a private capacity before emigrating to India before the Second World War. She wrote a number of articles on Buddhist themes together with full-length study on *Nāma-Rūpa and Dhamma-Rūpa* (University of Calcutta Press 1942).

Today, Departments of Indology exist in the Universities of Warsaw, Cracow, Wrocław and Lublin where Sanskrit and Prakrit are taught in relation to Pali (an optional subject since no specific courses in Indian religions are prescribed). At Warsaw a Young lecturer, Artur Karp, has taught Pali literature and language and translated sections 1-25 of the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta for *Euhemer*, the journal of the Polskie Towarzystwo Religioznawcze (Warsaw 1968). A former lecturer, Dr

Grazyna Spychalska-Wilczurawa, compiled an anthology from the Jātaka and Dhammapada (*Teksty Palijskie*), with an introduction in Polish, which the University duplicated in 1964. Apart from Michalski's grammar, B.C. Law's *History of Pali Literature* and Winternitz's *History of Indian Literature* are prescribed textbooks. The only known relevant doctoral dissertation accepted at Warsaw (in 1973) is Maria Meznicka's study on the "Dhammapada jako kodeks etyczny" ("The Dhammapada as an Ethical Code").

From the turn of the century a number of popular works, including translations of Buddhist texts, were published in Warsaw. These included Paul Dahlke's "Buddhist Stories" (*Opowiadania Buddyjskie*, 1906), an anthology from the Dhammapada compiled by R. Centnerszwer (*Buddha-Złote Słowa*, 1924), a more comprehensive selection by Jan Starza Dzierzbicki comprising Cullavagga VII, the *nidānakathā* to the Mahāpadāna Sutta (Dīgha Nikāya) Raṭṭhapāla Sutta (Majjhima Nikāya) Nālaka Sutta (Sutta-Nipāta) and Jātakas 241, 243, 316, 322, 325, 339 and 538 (*Legenda Buddyjskie*, 1927) and "Norma Etyczne w Buddyzmie" by Leon Krajewski—a long essay on the Dhammapada and Theravāda Buddhism which appeared in the Theosophical journal, *Przegląd Teozoficzny* No. 17 (1929).

The credit for founding the first indigenous Buddhist group goes to Piotr Boninski and Wladyslaw Misiewicz who, in 1949, established the Kolo Pryjaciol Buddyzmu ("Circle of Friends of Buddhism"). This remains centred on Radom (at the home of Misiewicz) where special meetings are held at Vesākha and on other important festival days. Otherwise, in view of the scattered membership contact can only be maintained by means of a newsletter.

Boninski was born 1898 in eastern Poland. After studying Law, he was drawn to the teachings of Theosophy and Hinduism but embraced Buddhism in 1946 after reading the works of Dahlke, Neumann, Oldenberg and Seidenstücker. His sudden death in 1968 at Gliwice was a severe blow to the Buddhist movement. Apart from translating articles from the German Buddhist periodical, *Wissen und Wandel*, he translated the following *suttas* from German sources: Dīgha 2, 13, 14, 22, 26, 31 and extracts from 1, 11, 16 and 21; Majjhima 2, 4, 9, 10, 12, 22, 23, 37, 41, 51, 59-62, 66, 77, 90, 91, 97, 117, 121, 130, 143 and extracts from 63, 120 and 135; Samyutta—Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, et al; Anguttara—Kālāma and Girimananda Suttas, et al; Khuddaka—a short selection from the Udāna, Itivuttaka and Sutta-Nipāta. Under the title *Wybor now Buddy* these were duplicated in the USA in 1965.

A fillip to the work of mass distribution of Buddhist literature was given for a short period by the late Dr T. Drobny, an emigre Theosophist who lived in Indiana (USA). Apart from editing a journal, his most valuable contributions were the duplication of Misiewicz's translation of Nyānatiloka's *Word of the Buddha*, Jan Skorzak's translation of Subhadra's *Buddhist Catechism* and parts of Boninski's translations in 1960 and 1965.

Wladyslaw Misiewicz is undoubtedly the longest practising Buddhist in Poland. He was born 1910 in Lvov (or Lemberg, as it then came within the frontiers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire). After matriculation, he was successively a bookbinder, Post Office official, accountant, an executive in a large government bookshop (after the Second World War), finally spending his last working years in charge of the reference library in his wife's home town of Radom (an industrial town south of Warsaw). On the outbreak of war on 1st September 1939 he served in the cavalry but spent the duration in German POW camps.

Disillusioned with the Church, he was first attracted to Buddhism by means of Michalski's translation of the Dhammapada. Soon after the War the Esperantist Geo. H. Yoxon sent him a copy of The (London) Buddhist Society's compilation, *What is Buddhism?*, together with the journal of the "Buddhist Esperanto League", *La Buddha Lumo*. These made a profound impression on his mind, but he was only finally convinced of the truth of the Buddhadhamma during the course of translating *Practical Buddhism* by Nyānasatta and *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation* by Nyānaponika. Subsequently, R. Semage despatched his series of pamphlets, *Buddha Rasmi*, from Colombo, together with a Pali grammar book, a *Buddharupa* and a Buddhist flag. Similar items, but particularly books and magazines, flowed from Ceylon (and later from contacts in the western world) to swell his library which must surely rank as the largest private collection on Buddhism in Poland. Totalling about 500 volumes, it includes Pali texts from London, English and German translations from the canonical texts, in addition to general studies in these languages, every Polish work on the subject, and scores of rare pamphlets and journals, mainly in English and German.

He has translated, apart from the above-mentioned works, the essence of G. F. Allen's *The Buddha's Philosophy*, numerous *suttas* and booklets issued by the Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy (Sri Lanka). Between 1952-59 he compiled an elementary Pali grammar. This was based on A. P. Buddhadatta's *New Pali Course I*, Duroiselle's *Practical Grammar of the Pali Language* and Nyānatiloka's *Kleine systematische Pali-Grammatik*, together with some texts from the Udāna.

In addition to English, German and Pali, Misiewicz has also mastered Esperanto. Since he received his earliest instruction in this international language (particularly from Nyānasatta), he has deemed it expedient to utilise Esperanto not only as a means of corresponding with like-minded students of Buddhism throughout the world but more especially to keep those domiciled in Eastern Europe informed of Buddhist doctrine and events where Esperanto serves as an unofficial lingua franca. Accordingly, he circulates an occasional newsletter amongst individuals in that area as well as in the USSR. He has also been able to regularly produce, in typescript, a Polish journal, *Ehi Passiko*, since 1962. This is despatched to several families throughout the country.

Another emigre Theosophist Wanda Dynowska (Umadevi, 1886-1971 translated Paul Carus' anthology, *Gospel of Buddha (Nauka Buddy)*, Indo Polish Library, Bombay 1962).

Finally, in Warsaw at the present time, Zdzislaw Nikuli has translated and duplicated a number of meditation tracts together with Nyānasatta's translation of the Saṭipatṭhāna Sutta (*Podstawy uważności*, 1975) and Piyadassi's essay on *paṭiccasamuppāda* (*Zależne powstawanie*, 1976).

BOOK REVIEWS

An Introduction to Buddhist Psychology. Padmasiri de Silva. Library of Philosophy and Religion—The Macmillan Press, London. 134 pp. £ 10.00.

The subject goes to the very centre of the Dhamma; the material studied is the Suttanikāya and *only* the Suttanikāya; and the book itself is concise and lucid—the subject clearly defined, carefully set out with nothing superfluous, nothing hazy—all is sharply in focus, and this is something rare and a pleasure to find.

A brief introductory chapter delineates the areas of study: cognition, motivation, emotions, and personality; basic features are sketched and some essential terms—*viññāṇa sankhārā*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, etc.—are clarified.

Cognition is looked at as a prelude to the study of motivation, for what is perceived through the sense bases can be fuel for latent desires and what is perceived is itself influenced and distorted by those same desires. Here is described, the synthetic nature of the puthujjana's perception—distorted by biases (*āsavā*) and proclivities (*anusayā*)—and the aim of the teaching—realised in the arahat—of clear, bare perception, wherein “In the seen, there will be just the seen; in the heard, just the heard; in the sensed, just the sensed; in the cognised, just the cognised.” The cognitive process productive of distorted and proliferating views is described within the Madhupindikasutta, and this relevant passage is quoted: “Visual consciousness, your reverence, arises because of the eye and material shapes; the meeting of the three is sensory impingement; feelings are because of sensory impingement; what one feels one perceives; what one perceives one reasons about; what one reasons about obsesses one; what obsesses one is the origin of a number of concepts and obsessions which assail a man in regard to material shapes cognisable by the eye.” A number of terms are discussed and defined in this section—*viññāṇa saññā*, *vitakka*, *vicāra*; also *pacchavekkhati*, *sati*, *sampajāna*, etc. ‘Higher knowledge’ is mentioned, which as a perceptual source is, as introspection is a methodology, excluded from consideration by established Western schools of psychology. Dr de Silva states: “Verbal testimony, analogical reasoning, logical reasoning, etc., are not completely satisfactory as means of knowledge. Perceptions, both normal and paranormal, along with inferences based on them, are the valid means of knowledge in Buddhism”. Also noted here is the wrong view of Dhamma as a ‘cutting off’ of the senses—the Dhamma is a training of the senses which is a development and refinement, a refinement which, of course, goes beyond aesthetics. The Dhamma is shown as therapy to clear and refine cognition by the elimination of obstructions and the cultivation of the

factors of enlightenment: “The elimination of the impediments makes the mind concentrated in meditation and this in turn makes it possible for it to have knowledge and insight of things as they are.”

The chapter ‘Motivation and Emotions’ is the longest of the book; the structure and aims of the psychology of motivation found within the Dhamma are therapeutic—designed to uncover the roots of unrest and depict a positive path towards happiness. The wholesome and unwholesome roots and the *paṭiccasamuppāda* structure—*phassa* to, *upādāna*—are discussed, here *upādāna* is translated ‘entanglement’ covering the obsession with the disliked as well as the liked. A note on *vedanā* is followed by a section in which is “put together the material on specific emotions discussed by the Buddha, in the hope of working out a Buddhist theory of emotions.” The specific emotions studied are: Fear with closely related factors such as *hiri*, *ottappa*, and *kukkucca*. Anxiety with *samvega*. Hatred with *issā*, *macchariya*, *hīnamāna*, etc. Grief and sorrow where the position of dhamma is given: “Mourning and weeping are not effective ways of dealing with the tragic. We should understand the causes and conditions of suffering and work out a therapy to remove the causes of suffering. The Buddhist attitude demands a sense of reality”. Love and compassion where is discussed the wide spectrum from erotic and sexual love through fondness and affection to sympathy and compassion, these discussed in the context of the lay and bhikkhu life. The section concerning motivation—‘The Psychology of Craving’—studies *taṇhā* in its three basic forms, craving for sensuality, self-preservation and annihilation—mention being made of the similarity of Freudian analysis, this a subject well covered in the author's excellent *Buddhist and Freudian Psychology*.

The three forms of *taṇhā* are discussed in detail in separate sections where it is emphasised that the psychology of *taṇhā* cannot be separated from the concept of *dukkha*. In discussing sensuality reference is made to the ethicoreligious dimension regarding acceptable and unacceptable pleasures, the dynamics of the psychology of pleasure, and to the predicament of the pure pleasure lover in the form of boredom, ennui and emptiness. Self-preservation is discussed in terms of egoistic drives and the basis of this in false beliefs and illusions (*diṭṭhi*); views such as self-conceit (*māna*)—measuring through the viewpoint of ego—and the philosophical standpoint of *sassata-diṭṭhi* are covered. Likewise self-annihilation is a product of ego view (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*) and produces the philosophical standpoint of *uccheda-diṭṭhi*; discussion is also made here of the expression of aggression. A further section of the chapter deals with ‘unconscious motivation’ and such terms as *anusaya*, *āsava*, *sankhārā* and *cetanā* are studied—the author states “The Buddha probed deeply into the roots of human motivation. The practice of diligent self-analysis, the techniques of concentration and mindfulness and the development of insight were all combined in a system of therapy. In this process of mind-development, the dark interior regions of the mind, the pattern of compulsive behaviour and the irrational biases had all to be laid bare and brought to the surface of clear consciousness, mindfulness and wakefulness”.

The chapter on personality is concerned with personality traits and types and such factors as conflict, frustration, anxiety and defence mechanisms. There is a discussion of the five techniques for the removal of distracting thoughts (*Vitakkasaṅṭhāna s.*) and a note on personality and society concerning social harmony—"protecting others one protects oneself" (S V 168).

The last chapter is a study of Buddhist and Western psychology; the therapeutic structure of Buddhist psychology here presented in a comparative perspective through the terms of four systems: Freudian psychological analysis, the humanist psychology of Rogers and Maslow, behaviourist therapy, and the existentialist therapy of Binswanger and May. The book ends with a study of the application of principles of Buddhist psychology to contemporary social pathology manifested in the concept of 'identity crisis'—the product of a lack of self-knowledge and self-direction. Study is made of such symptoms of this disease as narcissism, fear of solitude and boredom. The latter, boredom, leads to a consideration of the philosophy of emptiness within the Dhamma, for the author notes that "at this very moment of the emergence of being bored with oneself a real metamorphosis is possible, but people drown it with diversions. If one could only grasp with insight the nature of this 'nameless emptiness' one could come within the very doors of wisdom (the *anattā* doctrine)". Another clear minded thinker, Nāṇamoli Thera, was led to this hidden path—"Suppose boredom is a backstairs to liberation—insignificant, and so often overlooked.....Do not try to turn back now—here in the desert perhaps there are doors open—in the cool woods they are overgrown, and in the busy cities they have built over them." (*A Thinker's Note Book*—50).

Malcolm Hudson

Tales and Teachings of the Buddha The Jātaka Stories in Relation to the Pali Canon. John Garrett Jones. Foreword by Dr I. B. Horner. George Allen and Unwin, London 1979. xvi—216 pp. £ 6.95

Mr Jones's book is a stimulating and scholarly study based on the 547 Jātaka stories, which T. W. Rhys Davids described as "the oldest, most complete and most important collection of folk-lore extant". This vast corpus of legends which purport to tell of the deeds and exploits of the Lord Buddha's previous lives as a bodhisatta have had a significant and lasting influence on the culture and beliefs of lay Buddhists throughout Asia, particularly in Theravāda countries. For this reason alone the Jātaka stories are worthy of scholarly investigation as a seminal source of what might be called 'popular' Buddhism, and it is this somewhat neglected field of study which interests the author.

The book looks critically and analytically at the Jātaka legends, with particular reference to their ethical and doctrinal content. Whereas it is quite clear that most of the stories have their origin in the oral tradition of pre-Buddhist India; nevertheless, in their derived literary form, they have been adapted within a mythological framework to convey something

of Buddhist teaching to the ordinary lay-follower of the Dhamma. It is the specific Buddhist element in the Jātaka that is fundamental to this study, wherein three broad questions are considered: what teachings do the tales impart?; how far are these teachings internally consistent?; and, most importantly, how do they compare with the canonical teachings of the Sutta Piṭaka?

The book is divided into two parts. The first part examines the two primary sources: the Jātaka stories themselves and the first four Nikāyas of the Sutta Piṭaka. The chapter on the sources of the Jātaka examines in detail the origin and form of the stories, and includes a list of the various roles assumed by the bodhisatta during the course of the Jātaka tales.

The second part of the book deals with the main doctrinal and ethical themes of the stories. A separate chapter is devoted to different aspects of Buddhist teaching (such as *karma* and rebirth, non-injury, sex and marriage etc.) which have particular significance for the Buddhist layman; a summary of the canonical teaching is followed by an account of the presentation and interpretation of that teaching in the Jātaka tales. The author notes in each case the discrepancies, idiosyncracies and doctrinal inaccuracies that are contained in the Jātaka presentation and seeks to explain how these differences came about. For example, the Jātaka is at variance with the Nikāyas on the doctrine of rebirth: in the former, no attempt is made to reconcile the doctrine of *anattā* with the doctrine of a series of lives of the same individual—indeed, this simplistic view of the rebirth doctrine might be said to be the *sine qua non* of the Jātaka tales. However, the complexity of the canonical teaching on rebirth precludes such a simple, transmigratory view. Throughout the book we discover that the doctrinal position of the Jātaka is often at variance with canonical teaching—at times the connection between the two is seen to be very tenuous indeed.

Dr Horner's forward admirably summaries Mr Jones's accomplishments. He has succeeded well with his subject: his aims are clear and well-defined, his scholarship sure and wide-ranging, his style readable and fluent. Although he is not loth to offer his own criticisms, particularly on early Buddhist attitudes to women and personal relationship she does so in a constructive manner and without asperity.

One would imagine that this book will be of more interest to the Pali Buddhist scholar and the student of Indian folk-lore than to the general reader, although it can be read by the latter without difficulty. It will not provide him with a comprehensive introduction to the Jātaka, but it will give him an idea of the doctrines contained therein. It is unlikely, that a study of the Jātaka tales will provide much practical benefit to the Western Buddhist of today; although many of the stories can still be appreciated as moral fables, their doctrinal heterodoxy and the fact that the world portrayed in them is so remote from our own with probably make them unattractive to Western tastes.

A final point of interest: the Editor informs me that this book is the first commercial venture to make reference to the *Pali Buddhist Review* in its bibliography. May this be the first of many!

G. M. Jones

Studies in Pali and Buddhism. Edited by A. K. Narain. B. R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi 1979. xxxii—422pp. Rs. 180

This “memorial volume in honour of Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap”, edited by his nephew (Professor of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin), represents one of the most comprehensive *festschriften* of its kind. With no less than 37 papers (nearly all on the early Buddhist tradition) contributed by specialists from all over the world, this is a book well worth investing in.

So many aspects of Dhamma are surveyed that it is only possible to mention those that readers of this journal might find most relevant. Harvey Aronson’s opening essay on *upekkhā* follows his doctoral dissertation on the four *brahma vihāras* (Wisconsin 1975) which was recently published by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, and will be eventually reviewed. George Bond’s overview of the *Netti-pakarāṇa* represents a survey of this little-known exegetical work: hitherto, the only popular account had been written for *Prajñā* (Buddha Gaya Quarterly, 1975) by Dhammādhāra. John Ross Carter’s examination of “The Notion of ‘Refuge (Saraṇa)’ recalls Nyānaponika’s seminal Wheel booklet, *The Threefold Refuge*. “The Eight Deliverances” are explained at length by Leon Hurvitz who bases his study on Pali sources and la Vallee Poussin’s translation of the *Abhidharmakosa* VIII (summarised by Sukomal Chaudhuri on pp. 219-220 of his *Analytical Study of the Abhidharmakośa*, Sanskrit College, Calcutta 1976). In discussing the origin of the Buddha image, P. S. Jaini draws upon the apocryphal *Vaṭṭangulirāja Jātaka*, the 37th in the *Pannāsa Jātaka* collection, Vol. I of which he has edited for publication by the PTS this year. (A similar text, the *Kosala-Bimba-Vaṇṇanā*, was edited and translated by R. F. Gombrich for the Göttingen symposium, *Buddhism in Ceylon and Studies on Religious Syncretism in Buddhist Countries*, published in 1978.) The nature of the ultimate reality—*Nirvāṇa*—receives much needed clarification at the hands of India’s foremost Buddhist scholar, L. M. Joshi.

Chapters 22, 26, 28 and 29 comprise important contributions to early Buddhist literature. Kōgen Mizuno’s timely survey of the formation and place of the various recensions of the *Dharmapada* has probably not been tackled in detail since the appearance of P. K. Mukherjee’s paper on “The *Dharmapada* and *Udānavarga*” (*IHQ*, Calcutta 1935) H. Saddhātissa’s edited translation of G. Coedès’ *Catalogue des manuscrits en pāli, laotienne et siamoise provenant de la Thaïlande* (Copenhagen 1966). reveals the extent of “Pali Literature from Laos” and complements his earlier studies on Khmer and Thai Buddhist literature. The editing and translation of *Vinaya* texts during the period 1950-75 is admirably summarised by Charles Prebish, an American specialist in this field. Gustav Roth has contributed his notes to the introduction of the *Bhikṣu-Prātimokṣa-Sūtra* of the *Arya-Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin* tradition—for which a useful comparison may be made with his edition of the *Bhikṣuṇī Vinaya* belonging to the same lineage (Patna 1970) which includes a long introduction in English.

Trevor Ling and Eleanor Zelliott (virtually the only scholar engaged in research on Ambedkar’s movement) present accounts of the background to the revival of Buddhism in India during the last century. In this context it is worth mentioning Ling’s latest study, *Buddhist Revival in India* (London 1980). Hitherto, the only full-length surveys have been *Buddhism in Modern India* (Nagpur 1972) by D. C. Ahir and *Ambedkar and the Neo-Buddhist Movement* (Madras 1972) by T. S. Wilkinson and M. M. Thomas.

There are many more entries worthy of note but the foregoing should suffice to whet the appetite of readers who are recommended to acquire this tome.

RBW

Narada Felicitation Volume. Edited by Piyadassa Thera. Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy 1979. 193 pp. £2.75

To commemorate the completion of his 81st year, this volume of messages of felicitation and articles is offered to Nārada Mahāthera, the Head of the *Vajirārāma* in Colombo and veteran *Dhammaduta* bhikkhu.

The final contribution, a potted history of Buddhism by Olcott Gunasekera, occupies no less than 74 pages and dwarfs the remaining entries. Despite some factual inaccuracies and generalisations it is valuable in that it presents the colourful progress of the Dhamma not easily available elsewhere; indeed, the only comparable survey is the recent reprint of E. Conze’s *Short History of Buddhism* (London 1980). In similar vein are two brief articles on Indonesia and Vietnam, for which countries Ven. Nārada has maintained cordial links over many years.

Richard Gard places Buddhist studies in their modern perspective and suggests an analytical, subject approach for the future—a process that is, however, only likely to be fulfilled in the author’s country (USA) which boasts large numbers of scholars (who are personally committed to the Dhamma), well-established Oriental faculties at the universities and seemingly unlimited funds.

The interaction between “Empiricism in Early Buddhism and William James” and the Dhamma contra the atavistic tendencies in man are ably discussed by two convincing scholars of the present generation, D. J. Kalupahana and Gunapala Dharmasiri. The little-known cult of the Bodhi tree is examined by Gunapala Senadhira whilst Jotiya Dhirasekera takes to task those who misinterpret the “Text and Traditions” by basing their arguments on specious reasoning.

However, this reviewer derived most profit from “Dhamma-Desanā and Dhamma Sākacchā” by the only notable, professional Buddhist educationist: Ananda W. P. Guruge. Drawing upon the Pali texts, the theoretical and practical aspects of the virtues of expounding and discussing the Dhamma are well explained. Investigation and understanding are obvious corollaries but it is a sad reflection on the retarded

development of traditional Buddhist institutions that the art of debate was perfected only in the Tibetan monasteries. Clarification and evaluation of the Dhamma vis-a-vis current attitudes and lifestyles necessitates a two-way process between speaker and hearers, otherwise an uncritical acceptance of what is heard could lead to unskillful views and practices.

RBW

**KOMMISSION FÜR BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN
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**The Committee for Buddhist Studies
of the Academy of Sciences in Göttingen**
Prof. Dr Heinz Bechert

Hainbundstrasse 21,
D-3400 Göttingen,
Federal Republic of Germany

INFORMATION

**A SYSTEMATIC SURVEY OF BUDDHIST SANSKRIT—
LITERATURE SYSTEMATISCHE ÜBERSICHT ÜBER DIE
BUDDHISTISCHE SANSKRIT—LITERATUR**

Published by the Academy of Sciences (Akademie der Wissenschaften) in Göttingen

The need of a systematic bibliography in Buddhist Sanskrit philology is felt by all scholars working in Buddhist studies and related fields. It is the objective of the present project to provide comprehensive information on Buddhist Sanskrit literature including ancient and modern translations and commentaries of Buddhist Sanskrit texts. The survey is arranged in a systematic order.

The preliminary system of arrangement of the material in the survey is as follows:

A. Canonical and paracanonical texts

- *1. Vinaya. Published as Teil I: Vinaya—Texte by A. Yuyama. Wiesbaden 1979
2. Sūtra (of the Hīnayāna)
3. Abhidharma
4. Ksudraka and related texts
 - 4.1 Canonical and paracanonical texts minus the Jātaka and Avadāna (Dharmapada and Udāna, Itivṛttaka, Arthavarga, Pārāyaṇa, Sthaviragāthā)
 - 4.2 Buddha biographies (cf. also 7.7)
 - 4.3 Jātaka, Avadāna and related narrative texts
 - 4.4 Anāgatavaṃśa and Vyākaraṇa (prophecy)
 - 4.5 Sūtrasaṃgraha, Gāthāsaṃgraha, Paritrāṇa
 - 4.6 Other texts and various texts belonging to 4.

5. Mahāyānasūtra including Prajñāpāramitā (5.1) with several (not yet determined) subdivisions, as e.g. *Avatamsaka, *Ratnakūṭa, etc.
 6. Tantra, Mantra, Dhāraṇī, etc. (including Kālacakra)
 - B. Non-canonical materials and auxiliary sciences
 7. Non-canonical doctrinal texts, philosophy, Stotra, ritual texts, Kāvya
 - 7.1. Post-canonical doctrinal texts of the Hīnayāna
 - 7.2. Philosophical works and doctrinal texts of the Mahāyāna
 - 7.3. Philosophical works and doctrinal texts of Tantric Buddhism
 - * 7.4. Pramāṇa
 - 7.5. Stotra
 - 7.6. Ritual texts and regulations, Mantra and Yantra, etc. (if not in 6)
 - 7.7. Kāvya, *Lekha, Nāṭaka and related texts
 - 7.8. Subhāsita (Buddhist)
 - 7.9. Śāsana-itihāsa, biographies of monks, descriptions of shrine
 - 7.0. Various texts belonging to 7.
 - 7.01. Anthologies
 8. Buddhist inscriptions and documents, e.g. "donation forms"
 9. "Auxiliary sciences"
 - 9.1. Philology
 - 9.2. Silpavidyā
 - 9.3. Bibliography
 - * 9.4. Nītiśāstra
 - 9.5. Ratnasāstra
 - 9.6. Āyurveda
 - 9.7. Jyotiḥśāstra
 - C. General, undetermined or unidentified texts
 01. Texts on the arrangement of the canons, collections, etc. and history of the canons
 02. Undetermined canonical texts
 03. Undetermined post-canonical Hīnayāna texts
 04. Other undetermined texts
 05. Unidentified texts
- NOTE : With * sections are marked which totally or mainly correspond with equally or similarly determined sections in the Kanjur and/or Tanjur.

* * *

All interested scholars are kindly invited to co-operate and to contribute in this task. Comments for improvement of the systematic order are also invited. Those interested may kindly write to :

*Professor Dr Hein Bechert,
Direktor,
Seminar für Indologie und Buddhismuskunde
der Universität Göttingen,
Hainbundstrasse 21,
D-3400 GÖTTINGEN,
West Germany*

The volumes will appear in English, French or German according to the individual predilection of the authors. Since the volumes mainly consist of bibliographical references, parts in any of these languages may easily be used by all specialists and interested scholars irrespective of their knowledge of German and French.

The first part of the survey deals with the Vinaya literature and was compiled by Dr Akira Yuyama (The Director, The Reiyukai Library, Tokyo) when he was in Göttingen as a fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung in 1974—76.

The bibliographical information on the first volume is as follows :

Systematische Übersicht über die buddhistische Sanskrit-Literatur - A Systematic Survey of Buddhist Sanskrit Literature.

Im Auftrage der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen herausgegeben von Heinz Bechert:

Erster Teil : Vinaya-Texte. Von Akira Yuyama.

Wiesbaden : Franz Steiner Verlag 1979.

XXIII, 54 pages. Bds. DM20—

ISBN 3-515-02837-4

CONTENTS : Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādin—Vinaya of the Mūla-sarvāstivādin—Vinaya of the Dharmaguptaka—Vinaya of the Mahīśāsaka—Vinaya of the Mahā-sāṃghika—Lokottaravādin—Vinaya of unknown schools—Appendix : Selected bibliographical informations on the Vinaya literature—List of Chinese and Japanese proper names.

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